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ABSTRACT
Resource-Efficient Replication and Migration of Virtual Machines
by
Kai-Yuan Hou
Chair: Kang G. Shin
Continuous replication and live migration of Virtual Machines (VMs) are two vital tools
in a virtualized environment, but they are resource-expensive. Continuously replicating a
VM’s checkpointed state to a backup host maintains high-availability (HA) of the VM de-
spite host failures, but checkpoint replication can generate significant network traffic. Each
replicated VM also incurs a 100% memory overhead, since the backup unproductively re-
serves the same amount of memory to hold the redundant VM state. Live migration, though
being widely used for load-balancing, power-saving, etc., can also generate excessive net-
work traffic, by transferring VM state iteratively. In addition, it can incur a long completion
time and degrade application performance.
This thesis explores ways to replicate VMs for HA using resources efficiently, and to
migrate VMs fast, with minimal execution disruption and using resources efficiently. First,
we investigate the tradeoffs in using different compression methods to reduce the network
traffic of checkpoint replication in a HA system. We evaluate gzip, delta and similarity
compressions based on metrics that are specifically important in a HA system, and then
suggest guidelines for their selection.
Next, we propose HydraVM, a storage-based HA approach that eliminates the unpro-
xii
ductive memory reservation made in backup hosts. HydraVM maintains a recent image of
a protected VM in a shared storage by taking and consolidating incremental VM check-
points. When a failure occurs, HydraVM quickly resumes the execution of a failed VM by
loading a small amount of essential VM state from the storage. As the VM executes, the
VM state not yet loaded is supplied on-demand.
Finally, we propose application-assisted live migration, which skips transfer of VM
memory that need not be migrated to execute running applications at the destination. We
develop a generic framework for the proposed approach, and then use the framework to
build JAVMM, a system that migrates VMs running Java applications skipping transfer of
garbage in Java memory. Our evaluation results show that compared to Xen live migra-
tion, which is agnostic of running applications, JAVMM can reduce the completion time,
network traffic and application downtime caused by Java VM migration, all by up to over
90%.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Virtualization is used to create one or more Virtual Machines (VMs) that act like real
machines in a physical host. It facilitates flexible partitioning and dynamic allocation of
computing resources, and is widely used in computing environments of various kinds and
scales.
In a virtualized environment, applications run in VMs, and multiple VMs may be con-
solidated in a single physical server. Server consolidation has in fact been the most common
reason for using virtualization [66]. It is most useful when applications require a certain
level of isolation, e.g., isolation of configurations, performances, faults, and so on, yet each
of them does not need the full capacity of a single server. Running these applications in
separate VMs on a single physical server enhances server utilization and reduces various
operational costs, including management cost, power, space, etc.
However, server consolidation exacerbates the consequence of unexpected host fail-
ures. When VMs are consolidated, failure of a single host may bring down multiple VMs
on the host and all applications running thereon, resulting in an unacceptable aggregate
loss. As host failures are inevitable, even common in large systems [29, 94], maintaining
highly available VMs despite the occurrences of host failure has become a crucial task.
To achieve this, various approaches have been proposed to replicate VMs between hosts
continuously throughout VMs’ execution [20, 24, 32, 39, 44, 47, 93], but they incur high
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resource costs, creating a tension between high-availability and resource-efficiency, both
critical operational goals of a virtualized environment.
On the other hand, server consolidation increases the need for VM livemigration, which
is the ability to move a running VM from a physical host to another without disrupting the
VM’s execution. As co-located VMs’ workload dynamics and resource demands change,
live migration can be used to adjust placement of the VMs at runtime, to mitigate resource
hotspots [98] or enhance VM performance [31]. It can also be used to achieve power
savings [30, 40, 72]. While live migration has been implemented by many virtualization
platforms [9, 11, 38, 73], it can perform poorly when the underlying network is a bottle-
neck; it not only incurs a high resource cost, but also takes a long time to complete and
degrades running applications’ performance.
The needs to achieve VM high-availability (HA) at reduced resource costs and to per-
form VM live migration efficiently despite a network bottleneck are the two main motiva-
tions behind this thesis. Recognizing these needs, this thesis explores ways to (1) replicate
VMs for HA using resources efficiently; (2) migrate VMs fast, with minimal disruption to
VM execution and using resources efficiently. Below, we discuss the motivations of the
thesis in more detail, and then provide an overview of the thesis.
1.1 VM Replication for High-Availability
The simplest way to maintain highly available VMs despite the occurrences of physical
host failure is to reboot the VMs brought down by a host failure in other healthy hosts
automatically upon detection of the failure [21]. This approach is “stateless”, since the
restarted VM loses its runtime state before the failure.
To be able to resume a failed VM’s execution from where it left off upon failure, various
“stateful” HA approaches have been proposed. They create a backup VM in a separate host
for each primary running VM, and synchronize a primary VM’s runtime state to its backup
in one of the following two ways: log-and-replay [20, 32] and checkpoint replication [24,
2
39, 44, 47, 93]. The backup VM stands by in the background until the primary VM fails,
at which point it becomes active and takes over execution from the primary’s state before
the failure.
During normal operation of the primary, the aforementioned primary-backup synchro-
nization approaches work as follows. Log-and-replay records the low-level events executed
by the primary VM, e.g., instructions and interrupts, and replays them deterministically in
the backup VM, to bring the backup to the same state as the primary. Checkpoint replica-
tion sends the primary’s state to the backup directly and continuously, by sending a series
of primary VM checkpoints. In the two approaches, checkpoint replication is more widely
applicable to different hardware/software configurations in a virtualized environment; the
performance of log-and-replay can degrade significantly for VMs configured with multiple
virtual CPUs, since the shared memory communication between CPUs must be accurately
tracked and replayed [45, 88].
By maintaining backup VMs, stateful HA approaches minimize the loss of VMs’ com-
pleted work caused by failures, but at high resource costs. Though approaches based on
checkpoint replication have a wide applicability, they can impose a heavy load on network
resources, especially when frequent checkpointing is used to save the network packets of
client-facing applications before sending the packets out. For example, replicating check-
points for a single protected VM once every 25 ms can consume more than 3 Gb/s of
network bandwidth. When multiple VMs are protected at the same time, even dedicated
GbE links cannot provide the aggregate bandwidth required for checkpoint replication.
With such prohibitive network requirements, replicating VM checkpoints for HA could
potentially use up all available network resources, interfere with normal VM traffic, and
degrade application performance. The network traffic of checkpoint replication needs to be
reduced for real-world deployment of this technique, and this should be done taking into
consideration any impact on protected VMs’ HA properties and performances.
On the other hand, whether based on checkpoint replication or log-and-replay, existing
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HA approaches use in-memory backups. The backup VM sits in the memory of a dedicated
backup host, and reserves as much memory as its primary; the reserved memory space can-
not be utilized by other running VMs. Therefore, using existing approaches, eachVM pays
a 100%memory overhead to achieve HA. The backup memory reservation is unproductive,
since the backup VM does not contribute to workload execution and system throughput
until the primary fails. The aggregate backup memory reservation made for a group of
protected VMs can significantly and unproductively consume RAM, a rather expensive
computing resource. Furthermore, inactively blocking host memory for backup VMs may
hinder effective consolidation of active running VMs, and result in under-utilization of
other host resources (e.g., CPU cores). An alternative HA approach using memory effi-
ciently is thus needed, to reduce the overall memory requirement for supporting HA.
1.2 VM Live Migration
VM migration was first proposed to support user mobility [37], and the early migration
systems moved a VM while the VM was suspended (i.e., not executing) [61, 87]. Later,
VM live migration was proposed to move a VM while the VM is (mostly) executing [38,
73]. Live migration has different usages than the early migration systems. It is intended
to relocate VMs at runtime, and has primarily been used for achieving load-balancing,
performance enhancements, and so on. This thesis focuses on live migration of VMs.
Various contemporary virtualization technologies support live migration, and most of
them use a pre-copy approach [9, 11, 38, 73]. A pre-copy approach copies all the state of a
VM to be migrated to the destination host before the VM starts to execute in the destination
host. This is contrary to a post-copy approach [50], which copies a migrated VM’s state
from the source host after the VM starts execution in the destination. Pre-copy is more
widely used mainly for reliability reasons. Should the destination host fail in the middle of
migration of a VM, a pre-copy approach aborts the migration, and the VM remains running
in the source host. In a post-copy approach, a failure of the destination host may lead to
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a complete failure of the VM, since the VM has begun executing in the destination and its
state in the source host is only partially valid.
A pre-copy approach works as follows. To migrate a VM with minimal disruption to
its execution, while the VM continues to run in the source host, its memory pages are
transferred to the destination host incrementally and iteratively. In the first iteration, all of
the memory pages are sent; at each following iteration, only the pages dirtied during the
previous iteration are sent. Ideally, dirty pages should be transferred faster than new pages
get dirtied. As the iterations progress, the number of dirty pages pending transmission
should decrease. In the last iteration, the VM is paused, but only for a short time, since
only a small number of dirty pages remain to be sent. After this short pause, the VM
resumes execution in the destination, and migration of the VM completes.
However, this ideal migration is not always achieved, since the underlying network
can be a bottleneck. Under this condition, VM memory pages are dirtied faster than they
can be transferred to the destination, and the number of dirty pages pending transmission
cannot be reduced iteratively. This can result in sending a large number of dirty pages in
each iteration, and the iterations can last long until the last one, during which the VM is
paused. Consequently, the migration can take a long time to complete, create significant
network traffic and cause a noticeable VM downtime, which leads to degradation of run-
ning applications’ performance. For example, we have observed live migration of a 2GB
database VM over a gigabit Ethernet to last for more than one minute, generate 7GB (over
3x the VM size) of network traffic, cause 8 seconds of VM downtime and degrade the
database application’s performance by more than 20%. It is crucial to enhance live mi-
gration to overcome the network bottlenecking problem, but previous enhancements (e.g.,
[38, 50, 54, 92]), mostly treating migrating VMs as black boxes, incur either high resource
costs or application performance penalties.
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1.3 Thesis Overview
The following statement summarizes this thesis:
VMs need to be replicated for high-availability (HA) against host failures at reduced
resource costs, and migrated with minimal execution disruption even when network is a
bottleneck. Approaches to reducing the network traffic of VM checkpoint replication in
a HA system should be applied adaptively based on workload scenarios, and a memory-
efficient HA alternative is feasible. Assistance from applications running in migrating VMs
is useful for efficient VM live migration despite a network bottleneck.
This thesis consists of three parts to fulfill the above statement.
The first part of the thesis focuses on reducing the network traffic of VM checkpoint
replication in a HA system. Checkpoint compression has been suggested to meet this pur-
pose. While several compression methods are available, they have not been compared
systematically when applied to VM checkpoints in the context of supporting HA. There-
fore, we build a generic framework to evaluate compression methods based on metrics
that are specifically relevant and important in a HA system. The primary objective of our
evaluation is to quantify the tradeoffs between the effectiveness and overheads of differ-
ent compression methods, and provide insights that could guide their selection. Using our
framework, we evaluate and compare three compressionmethods: two existing approaches,
gzip and delta compression, and a method we explore, called similarity compression; simi-
larity compression applies redundancy elimination to VM checkpoints continuously at fine
time granularities to reduce checkpoint traffic. Our evaluation shows that one can hardly
find a single best compression solution to the problem of reducing checkpoint traffic. Based
on the experimental results, we provide guidelines for applying the different compression
methods according to the workload types and resource constraints in a HA system.
The second part of this thesis proposes a memory-efficient HA approach for VMs,
called HydraVM, to reduce the cost of making backup memory reservation for VM protec-
tion. The primary objective of HydraVM is to provide stateful protection for VMs against
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failures of their hosting machines without any backup memory reservation. Instead of
maintaining a backup VM in a separate server, HydraVM keeps track of the runtime state
of a protected VM in a fail-over imagemaintained in a networked, shared storage, which is
commonly deployed in a virtualized environment to hold VM disks and facilitate VMman-
agement. Upon detection of a failure, HydraVM performs a slim VM restore, which loads
only a small amount of critical VM state from the fail-over image to quickly bring a failed
VM back alive. As the VM resumes execution, the VM state not yet loaded is supplied on-
demand. Our experimental results show that HydraVM provides VM protection at a low
overhead, and can recover a failed VM within 2.2 seconds. This memory-efficient, storage-
based approach complements the HA toolbox currently available to system administrators
with a cost-effective alternative.
Finally, this thesis proposes application-assisted live migration. We take a white-box
approach to efficient VM live migration. Our approach leverages assistance from appli-
cations running in a migrating VM, and skips transfer of the VM’s memory pages that
need not be migrated for the applications to execute in the destination host. It reduces the
amount of memory transfer during live migration, with the objective of migrating the VM
fast, with minimal disruption to VM execution and using resources efficiently. We build a
generic framework for application-assisted live migration, and then use the framework to
build JAVMM, a system that migrates VMs running Java applications skipping transfer of
garbage in Java memory. In JAVMM, Java Virtual Machine (JVM), the application-level
VM that executes Java bytecode, is enabled to provide all the assistance needed for mi-
gration on behalf of Java applications; no modifications to Java applications are required.
Our experimental results show that compared to Xen live migration, which is agnostic of
applications running in migrating VMs, JAVMM can migrate a Java VM with up to more
than 90% shorter completion time, less network traffic and shorter application downtime.
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1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter II describes the framework we build for evaluating checkpoint compression
methods, and discusses the experimental results of evaluating and comparing gzip, delta
and similarity compressions using our framework, as well as the insights gained from the
evaluation.
Chapter III presents HydraVM, a memory-efficient, storage-based HA approach for
VMs. We discuss the rationale, advantages and limitations of a storage-based HA approach,
and describe the design, implementation and evaluation of HydraVM.
Chapter IV describes application-assisted live migration. We first present a generic
framework for VM live migration to use applications’ assistance, and then describe the
design, implementation and evaluation of JAVMM, built based on the framework to migrate
Java VMs using JVM’s assistance.
Chapter V summarizes the contributions and future directions of this thesis.
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CHAPTER II
Tradeoffs in Compressing Virtual Machine Checkpoints in
High-Availability Systems
2.1 Introduction
Continuous checkpoint replication is a prevalent approach to maintaining highly avail-
able VMs even in the case of host failures [24, 39, 44, 47, 93]. It periodically captures the
state of a VM in checkpoints, and replicates the checkpoints to a backup host. If the physi-
cal host of the VM fails, the VM can be restored from the most recent checkpoint available
in the backup. However, checkpoint replication protects VMs at the expense of significant
network traffic. Large amounts of checkpoint data are transported over the network, espe-
cially when frequent checkpointing is used by client-facing, latency-sensitive applications
to checkpoint network packets before sending them out. Reducing checkpoint replication
traffic is crucial to using this technique in real-world HA systems.
One way of reducing checkpoint traffic is to “compress” checkpoints before sending
them over the network. Checkpoint compression requires no modifications to a VM, and
can be applied regardless of the applications running in the VM. It can be done by a general-
purpose tool, such as gzip [5]. Alternatively, for each dirty memory page in a checkpoint,
the bits that are actually changed (called the page delta) may be identified, and the delta
is replicated instead of the full page [69, 80, 92, 97]. These compression methods are
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available, but they have not been evaluated comparatively and systematically when applied
to VM checkpoints in the context of supporting HA. There are few guidelines for selecting
and using them under different workloads and operating conditions in a HA system.
The primary goal of this chapter is to quantify the tradeoffs between the effectiveness
and overheads of various checkpoint compression methods, and provide insights that could
guide their selection decisions. We compare three compression methods, including gzip,
delta compression, and a method we explore, called similarity compression. Similarity
compression finds and eliminates duplicate contents in VM checkpoints to reduce check-
point traffic, exploiting the content redundancy in VM memory. Different from existing
memory deduplication systems, which coalesce identical pages of co-located VMs and
reduce host memory pressure [49, 58, 70, 96], similarity compression finds redundant con-
tents in the changed set of VM pages, i.e., the VM checkpoints, and much more frequently.
We evaluate the three compression methods using workloads chosen from types fre-
quently seen in HA systems, including server workloads that constantly interact with exter-
nal clients and long-running computation jobs. Our results show that one can hardly find a
single best compression solution. gzip reduces checkpoint traffic substantially, but at a pro-
hibitive CPU cost. It takes a long time to replicate and store each checkpoint when gzip is
used, and this limits the applicability of gzip for interactive, latency-sensitive applications
needing frequent checkpointing. Delta compression incurs a low CPU overhead and short
checkpoint transfer times, but requires a cache larger than the average checkpoint size of
a protected VM to achieve a reasonable traffic reduction. For workloads that touch large
areas of memory rapidly, delta compression can consume hundreds of MBs of RAM for
the cache.
Similarity compression eliminates redundant contents within checkpoints of the same
VM (intra-VM similarity), and between checkpoints of different VMs on a host (inter-VM
similarity). It is particularly effective for VM clusters running homogeneous workloads,
such as High Performance Computing (HPC) clusters. Our results show that a non-trivial
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amount of VM similarity exists in these environments, especially when VMs collaborate
on a shared task set. However, in heterogeneous workload scenarios, limited VM similarity
is found, so gzip and delta compression are better suited. Although similarity compression
is suited for a smaller range of application scenarios compared to the other two methods,
for suitable scenarios, it reduces checkpoint traffic effectively using both CPU and memory
efficiently, and requires short checkpoint transfer time and storage time.
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, it explores similarity compression,
and proposes its use in homogeneous workload scenarios. Similarity compression is a new
application of the existing concept of redundancy elimination; it applies redundancy elim-
ination to changed VM memory continuously at fine time granularities, and our evaluation
quantifies the effectiveness of redundancy elimination in this specific case. Second, to our
best knowledge, this chapter presents the first detailed evaluation and characterization of
checkpoint compression methods in the context of supporting HA, considering gzip, delta
and similarity compressions. Third, based on the evaluation results, this chapter suggests
guidelines for selecting and using these compression methods for different workload types
and resource constraints in a HA system.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides background
on checkpoint replication. We describe our evaluation framework in Section 2.3 and the
three compression methods evaluated in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents and analyzes our
experimental results. We discuss the insights gained from our evaluation in Section 2.6.
Section 2.7 describes related work, and the chapter concludes with Section 2.8.
2.2 Checkpoint Replication
2.2.1 Preliminaries
Checkpoint replication protects a VM from the failure of its physical host by sending
checkpoints of the VM to a backup host continuously [24, 39, 44, 47, 93]; the backup
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host is chosen so that it is isolated from the failure of the protected host. When protection
begins, a full checkpoint containing every memory page and the CPU state of the protected
VM is replicated to the backup. It is stored in the backup’s RAM, and becomes the fail-over
image of the protected VM.1
As the VM executes, incremental checkpoints are taken and replicated to the backup,
usually at fixed time intervals (a pre-configured checkpointing frequency). An (incremen-
tal) checkpoint mainly consists of the VM pages dirtied during the last checkpointing in-
terval. After all dirty pages in a checkpoint are replicated to the backup, their contents are
stored in proper locations in the fail-over image according to the page indexes. The fail-
over image is not updated as each dirty page is received, or it may become inconsistent and
unusable for recovery if the protected host fails in the middle of sending a checkpoint. If a
checkpoint takes longer than the configured checkpointing interval to replicate, the subse-
quent checkpoint is not taken when the next interval begins, but delayed until the on-going
replication finishes. This way, checkpoints are not sent faster than they can be stored and
made useful in the fail-over image.
Once a failure of the VM host is detected, the HA system initiates a fail-over. The failed
VM is restored based on its fail-over image (in the backup’s RAM) and a consistent disk
state (in a shared storage), and resumes operation from the most recent checkpointed state
in the backup host. In order to make this fail-over transparent to the VM’s external clients,
the HA system ensures that the clients never see “unprotected” VM state, i.e., the state not
yet backed up. Specifically, during normal operation of the VM, outgoing network packets
are withheld until the checkpoint capturing the state from which the packets are generated
is fully replicated to the backup. Therefore, HA systems commonly use checkpointing
intervals of tens of milliseconds or even shorter, in order to checkpoint and release network
packets very frequently and achieve reasonable performance for client-facing applications.
1VM disks are usually hosted in a shared storage accessible to all VM hosts. A VM disk state consistent
with the VM’s memory and CPU state in the fail-over image may be maintained by the storage system using
copy-on-write techniques [12, 67, 84, 85].
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Figure 2.1: The bandwidth requirements and total traffic of checkpoint replication during
two minutes of workload execution.
2.2.2 Need for Checkpoint Compression
We ran different workloads in VMs, and replicated VM checkpoints for two minutes
of workload executions. Figure 2.1 shows the network bandwidth required and total traffic
generated by checkpoint replication (see Table 2.1 for workload details). When check-
points are replicated every 25 ms, protection of a media transcoding (ffmpeg) server and a
database (voltdb) server uses more than 1700 Mb/s and 3000 Mb/s of network bandwidth,
respectively. Even a dedicated GbE link cannot meet these requirements for protecting a
single VM. When 4 VMs are protected concurrently, replicating checkpoints every 25 ms
creates almost 100 GB of traffic in the network in only two minutes. To replicate these
checkpoints at the configured checkpointing intervals, over 6500 Mb/s of network band-
width is required. Even if a 10GbE link is available, it will soon become saturated with just
a few more VMs to protect.
One may consider installing faster networks to meet the bandwidth requirement of
checkpoint replication. However, higher-bandwidth links are expensive, and it is not al-
ways feasible to upgrade networks in existing infrastructures. Furthermore, as more and
more VMs need protection, checkpoint replication traffic may eventually use up all avail-
able network resources and interfere with normal VM traffic, degrading application per-
formance and users’ experience with VMs. Therefore, reducing checkpoint traffic when
providing VM protection is a must. This chapter conducts a systematic evaluation and
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comparison of three compression methods for reducing checkpoint traffic, and provides
guidelines for their selections in a HA system. Next, we describe how each compression
method is evaluated.
2.3 Evaluation Methodology
2.3.1 Framework
To facilitate systematic comparison of multiple compression methods, we took an emu-
lation approach for our evaluation. We built a framework consisting of a checkpoint sender
(emulhacp) and a checkpoint receiver (emulharcv), which emulate the replication and
storage of VM checkpoints in a HA system, as described in Section 2.2.1. emulhacp and
emulharcv use multiple concurrent threads to emulate concurrent protection of multiple
VMs. Different compression methods are implemented as modules inserted into the frame-
work for evaluation.
To use this framework, we capture VM checkpoints a priori in a real HA system [52],
and store them as individual files. emulhacp runs in a protected host. It reads a complete
checkpoint from a file into a memory buffer, and from then operates on the buffer. It
processes each dirty page using the compression method to be evaluated, and then sends
the page to emulharcv, which runs in the backup. Once all dirty pages are received,
emulharcv sends an ACK to emulhacp, and begins to decompress each page and store the
page content to the fail-over image kept in RAM.
After emulhacp receives the ACK, it waits until the current checkpointing interval ends,
and replicates a new checkpoint when the next interval begins. If an ACK is not received
by the beginning of the next interval, emulhacp waits for the current checkpoint to be fully
replicated, and immediately after an ACK is received, it sends a new checkpoint. In this
case, emulharcv is receiving a new checkpoint while decompressing and storing the one
just received at the same time.
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We use double buffering in the backup: emulharcv uses at most two checkpoint buffers
at the same time for each VM. If, by the time emulharcv receives the new incoming check-
point in entirety, the previous checkpoint is not yet fully decompressed and incorporated
into the fail-over image, the VM may not replicate more checkpoints. Checkpoint replica-
tion is resumed when the previous checkpoint is completely stored and its buffer released
to receive another incoming checkpoint. Double buffering keeps any VM from using too
much memory in the backup, and is especially useful when checkpoints take a non-trivial
amount of time to store due to decompression.2
2.3.2 Metrics
We identify important metrics to consider when using checkpoint compression in a HA
system, and evaluate them in our framework. For each compression method, we evaluate
the traffic reduction achieved in each checkpointing interval, and the memory and CPU
used in the protected and backup hosts to achieve such reduction. A compression method
that uses excessive resources in the protected host can create a non-trivial interference with
the normal operation of the protected VMs. The resource usage in the backup is also
considered, since other active VMs may be running in the host (and backed up elsewhere)
and their performances can be affected.
Thememory cost of a compression method is evaluated by the average memory usage
of its key data structures that enable page compression/decompression. CPU cost is evalu-
ated by a per-page metric. We measure the total CPU time taken by emulhacp to compress
and send checkpoints for all concurrently protected VMs. We then divide this time by the
number of dirty pages processed, and obtain the average CPU time spent for each page.
Likewise, we obtain the average CPU time taken by emulharcv to receive, decompress
and store each page in the backup. These per-page metrics facilitate a fair comparison
2We use this simple scheme to facilitate evaluation and fair comparison of compression methods. Sophis-
ticated flow control schemes may be devised to regulate checkpoint traffic in real HA systems, taking into
account the checkpointing frequencies, compression methods and workloads used.
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between different compression methods.
Besides consuming resources, compression affects the time required to replicate and
store a checkpoint. We evaluate the transfer time of each checkpoint, which starts when
emulhacp begins to send the checkpoint, and ends when an ACK for the checkpoint is re-
ceived. Checkpoint transfer time consists of two components: the time to process/compress
the dirty pages (processing time), and the time to send them over the network (sending
time). Replicating compressed checkpoints reduces sending time, but performing compres-
sion lengthens processing time. The overall effect of compression on checkpoint transfer
time must be quantified experimentally.
Checkpoint transfer time has a direct impact on achievable checkpointing frequency,
which in turn affect the performance and HA property of a protected VM. Since a sub-
sequent checkpoint may be replicated only after the on-going replication finishes, the ac-
tual (elapsed, not configured) checkpointing interval must be larger than the transfer time
of a checkpoint. If a compression method incurs long transfer times, consecutive check-
points must be separated by large intervals, thus the achievable checkpointing frequency is
lowered. This can degrade application performance during normal operations, especially
for latency-sensitive, server applications, since network packets are checkpointed and re-
leased infrequently. For computation jobs without external observers, low checkpointing
frequency results in a greater loss of completed work upon a fail-over, since the VM has to
resume execution from an earlier point in time.
The storage time of each checkpoint can also affect achievable checkpointing fre-
quency and the performance of a protected VM. It is the time required to decompress all
dirty pages and store their contents to the fail-over image. Without compression, check-
point storage time is usually very short, since memory copying is fast. However, checkpoint
storage time can be significantly lengthened when compression is used, if dirty page de-
compression involves complex steps or heavy computations. Checkpoint replication can
become bottlenecked on slow storage of checkpoints: a new checkpoint may be delayed
16
waiting for a previous one to be completely stored so that the buffer space can be utilized,
since a protected VM is not allowed to use unlimited memory in the backup.
2.4 Checkpoint Compression
Using the framework and metrics discussed in Section 2.3, we evaluate the three com-
pression methods described below.
2.4.1 Existing Techniques
gzip is a commonly-used, general-purpose compression algorithm. Its application on check-
point traffic was briefly discussed in [39] without a thorough evaluation. We implemented
gzip using zlib [23] to evaluate it thoroughly and in comparison with other methods.
Delta compression identifies the parts in a dirty page that are changed when the page is
written to, i.e., the page delta, and replicates the delta to the backup instead of the entire
page. It has been used in a few HA systems [69, 80].
Before sending a checkpoint, each dirty page is XOR’ed with its content in the last
checkpointing interval. The outcome is compressed by RLE (Run-Length Encoding) [77],
and the compression result is sent to the backup. To restore the page content in the backup,
the RLE result is decoded, and the outcome is XOR’ed with the content of the page in
the fail-over image; no extra memory copying is needed. Since keeping the prior content
of every page incurs a 100% memory overhead, like previous work, we maintain a fixed-
size cache of transmitted dirty pages. If a dirty page finds its prior content in the cache,
delta compression is performed and the compression outcome is sent. On a cache miss,
the entire page is replicated without compression. We implemented a LRU cache using a
double linked list for efficient replacement and a lookup array to speed up queries. We use
Basic Compression Library [2] for RLE.
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2.4.2 Exploiting VM Similarity
Since VMs in a virtualized datacenter are often created from template images consisting
of the same or similar operating systems and applications, they can load nearly identical
kernel images and software binaries into memory, and read duplicate data from common
files. Many systems use this content redundancy to enable page sharing [49, 58, 70, 96].
They detect duplicate contents in the entire memory space of co-located VMs, and coalesce
identical pages in the same physical frame to save host memory.
We argue that not only may VMs be created from similar sources, even as they execute,
various activities can keep changing their memory state in similar ways. For example,
during maintenance, a group of VMs is updated with the same set of security patches at
the same time. Also, in computing clusters, multiple VMs (and multiple processes in each
VM) collaborate to finish computation-intensive tasks, each running the same application
code and working on a common set of data. These VMs are often checkpointed at the same
time intervals to gain a comparable level of protection, and the similar changes made to
their memory may generate similar dirty pages in their checkpoints. We therefore explore
similarity compression, which finds content redundancy in VM checkpoints and sends
only one copy of the duplicate contents to reduce checkpoint traffic.
To detect content redundancy, we divide each dirty page into multiple chunks, and
process checkpoints by chunks. Unique chunks are separated from duplicate chunks. A
unique chunk contains a content different from any other chunks that have been processed.
This content must be replicated to the backup in full. A duplicate chunk contains a content
that is identical to at least one other chunk. Since the duplicate content can be found in
another chunk that is already replicated (called a reference chunk), instead of sending the
chunk again, we send a pointer to locate the reference chunk in the backup.
For similarity compression to be practically useful, two important requirements must be
met: (1) unique and duplicate chunks must be separated quickly, and (2) the pointers sent
for duplicate chunks must be small, yet contain enough information to restore the duplicate
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contents in the backup. To meet these requirements, we build a hash table in the protected
host. The hash table maps a chunk content to a chunk location that has the content. Chunk
location is described by the VM to which the chunk belongs and the offset of the chunk
in the checkpoint containing it. Chunk content is compactly represented and efficiently
compared using the MD5 digest of the chunk. We also tested Rabin fingerprinting [79]
over a sliding window, another commonly used method of detecting content redundancy,
but found that to be much slower. For efficiency, we chose to detect duplicate fixed-size
chunks by hashes.
In each checkpointing interval, the hash table is initially empty, and the checkpoints
taken for concurrently protected VMs are processed together. For each chunk in the check-
points, we compute its MD5 digest, and query the hash table by the digest. If the digest is
not found in the hash table, the chunk content is sent to the backup, since this is a unique
content that is not seen before. A new entry is inserted into the hash table to record the
content and location of the chunk.
If the hash table lookup finds the chunk digest, we have a duplicate chunk, and the
matching hash entry records the location of a replicated chunk with the same content, that
is, the reference chunk. The location of the reference chunk is sent to the backup as a
pointer, following which the duplicate content can be retrieved when incorporating the
checkpoint into the fail-over image.3 The reference chunk may belong to the same, or a
different VM than the duplicate chunk does, upon detection of intra- and inter-VM similar-
ity, respectively.
To increase the chance of finding and eliminating redundancy in checkpoint traffic, we
also explore maintaining the hash table beyond interval boundaries. Instead of rebuilding
the hash table in every checkpointing interval, we rebuild it every few intervals. With a
multi-interval hash table, a duplicate chunk may contain the content of a chunk seen in a
past interval. However, when a past chunk content is referenced, the referenced chunk in
3In our current implementation, each hash entry is 20 bytes. Chunk location is encoded in 4 bytes in the
entry, and the remaining 16 bytes contain the MD5 digest of the chunk.
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HPC-C [8]
A suite of 7 calculation-intensive benchmarks essential to long-running scientific
jobs. We run HPC-C in a single VM and also in multiple VMs that collaborate via
MPI. Each VM uses 512 MB RAM.
RUBiS [15]
An auction site benchmark modeled after ebay.com. We use a three-tier setup:
a back-end database, a RUBiS server (Apache/PHP) and a client emulator. Each
tier runs in a separate VM on a separate host. Our experiments use checkpoints of
the RUBiS server (a 512 MB VM).
FFmpeg [3]
An open-source tool to “transcode” video/audio files, i.e., to convert their codecs
and formats. The transcoded media are usually fed to a real-time streaming service
to fulfill requests from external clients. We run FFmpeg in a 512 MB VM.
VoltDB [22]
An in-memory database. We run it in a 1.75GB VM to support a TPC-C-like
workload generated from a client VM running in a separate host. This OLTP
workload simulates an order-entry environment for a business with multiple ware-
houses [18]. Our experiments use checkpoints of the VoltDB server.
Table 2.1: The workloads used in our evaluation and their setup.
the fail-over image may have been overwritten with a recent content. To ensure correct
restoration of all duplicate contents, when a multi-interval hash table is used, a replicated
(unique) chunk is cached in the backup until the next time the hash table is rebuilt and the
chunk’s content can no longer be referenced by other chunks.
2.5 Experimental Results
This section presents and analyzes our evaluation results of the three compression meth-
ods. Section 2.5.1 describes the workloads and testbed used in our evaluation. Section 2.5.2
evaluates the traffic reduction achieved by each compression method. Section 2.5.3 and
Section 2.5.4 evaluate the resource and time overheads incurred by each method for achiev-
ing traffic reduction, respectively.
2.5.1 Workloads and Testbed
The computation tasks needing HA most are the ones that are not repeatable or pro-
hibitively expensive to repeat after a failure occurs. These tasks include server workloads
that constantly interact with external clients, and long-running computing jobs such as sci-
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Checkpoint Checkpointing Intervals (ms)
Sizes (MB) 5000 2000 1000 100 50 25
HPC-C 19.3 18.2 13.1 3.1 2.1 1.7
RUBiS 13.0 11.4 8.2 4.4 4.1 3.7
FFmpeg 19.0 12.9 10.8 8.0 6.8 5.4
VoltDB 396.7 207.5 114.4 20.0 13.2 9.6
Table 2.2: The average checkpoint sizes of each workload.
entific computations. Our evaluation uses four different workloads of these types. Table 2.1
summarizes the workloads we use and their setup.
We run the workloads in VMs, take periodic checkpoints of the VMs for two minutes
of workload execution, and store the checkpoints taken for repeated use in our various ex-
periments. For each workload, we capture multiple series of checkpoints, each using a
different checkpointing interval length. We use sub-second (25, 50 and 100 ms) check-
pointing intervals to reflect those used in current HA systems [39], and also longer (1, 2
and 5 secs) intervals to explore a wider parameter space. For two minutes of workload exe-
cution, checkpointing every 5 seconds to every 25 ms generates 24 to 4800 checkpoints in
each series. Table 2.2 summarizes the average checkpoint sizes of the different workloads.
While in some cases individual checkpoints seem small, especially when taken at short in-
tervals, sending these checkpoints frequently creates excessive network traffic in only two
minutes, as discussed in Section 2.2.2.
All checkpoints are taken on HP Proliant BL465c blades, each with two dual-core AMD
Opteron 2.2GHz CPUs, 4–8 GB RAM, one GbE NIC and two SAS 10K rpm disks. All
our experiments are run on the same testbed. emulhacp and emulharcv run on top of
Xen in the Domain-0 of two separate blades in the same LAN; this setup resembles the
typical setup in a virtualized datacenter where protected and backup hosts are connected
by an internal LAN for management operations. In each experimental run, emulhacp and
emulharcv process complete series of checkpoints, and report average results over the
checkpoints processed.
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Figure 2.2: The traffic reductions achieved for a single protected VM running different
workloads. The ”sim-*” lines show the traffic reductions achieved by similarity
compression using different chunk sizes and a single-interval hash table, and
the ”sim2-*” lines show those achieved using a two-interval hash table.
2.5.2 Traffic Reduction
We first evaluate how each compression method reduces checkpoint traffic for a single
protected VM. Figure 2.2 shows the traffic reductions achieved when different workloads
are running in the protected VM. gzip is effective for various workloads and checkpointing
frequencies. It reduces traffic by 40–80% in our evaluation.4 Smaller traffic reductions are
achieved for FFmpeg and HPC-C at 1-second and longer checkpointing intervals. These
FFmpeg checkpoints contain large amounts of media contents that are already encoded
by video/audio codecs, and hence are not compressed much further by gzip. The HPC-C
checkpoints have many numerical values from the computation matrices of the workload.
4We use level 1 (fastest) compression for gzip. Our experiments with higher levels of compression show
only 1-2% more reductions with a 4x CPU overhead for gzip.
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The randomness of these values are not friendly to the gzip compression algorithm.
We evaluate delta compression starting with a 32MB delta cache, which is large enough
to store at least one complete checkpoint for most of the workloads and checkpointing fre-
quencies we use. To test the sensitivity of traffic reduction to cache size, we also evaluate a
smaller (16 MB) cache. The traffic reductions achieved by delta compression vary widely
in our experiments, ranging from 0% to 92% for different workloads and checkpointing fre-
quencies. The effectiveness of delta compression is mainly impacted by how the delta cache
is sized in relation to the size of the checkpoints. Our results suggest that to achieve more
than 40% traffic reductions, the delta cache must be larger than the average checkpoint
size of the workload under the checkpointing frequency used.
A 16 MB cache is effective for RUBiS. When RUBiS is checkpointed at sub-second
intervals, a 16 MB cache holds at least 5 consecutive checkpoints, and keeps a good history
of the dirty page contents of the workload. The cache produces over 98% hit rates, letting
almost all checkpointed pages be compressed before network transmission. In these cases,
delta compression outperforms gzip and achieves up to 92% traffic reduction.
A 16 MB cache becomes ineffective at 1-second and longer checkpointing intervals for
HPC-C. In these cases, using a 32 MB cache improves traffic reductions by an additional
41–81%, thanks to a 49–89% increase of cache hit rate. However, a 32 MB cache is still
far from enough for VoltDB. At 1-second and longer intervals, the checkpoint traffic of
VoltDB is not reduced at all. Each of these VoltDB checkpoints contains 100–400 MB of
dirty page contents, much more than the delta cache can hold, and all cached dirty pages
have to be replaced before enabling any compression. Thus, to reduce VoltDB checkpoint
traffic reasonably in these cases, hundreds of MBs of RAM must be provisioned for the
delta cache.
Given a sufficiently large cache, delta compression is more effective for workloads that
modify memory pages by smaller areas. We observed that even though the cache is com-
parably effective for FFmpeg and RUBiS, producing over 97% hit rates for both workloads
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at sub-second intervals, the checkpoint traffic of FFmpeg is reduced by 34–45% less than
that of RUBiS. Our off-line analysis shows that, upon a cache hit, a dirty page of RU-
BiS is compressed by more than 80%, while FFmpeg’s dirty page is compressed by less
than 50%. This is because RUBiS modifies small areas in memory pages, but FFmpeg
changes each page significantly by reading media contents in 4 KB blocks from disk to be
transcoded; compressing FFmpeg’s buffer pages by the changes from their past contents
does not reduce data size effectively.
We evaluate similarity compression using 256 byte, 1 KB and 4 KB chunks to detect and
remove redundancy in checkpoint traffic. For each workload, using 256 byte chunks always
reduces traffic more effectively than using 1 KB chunks, which is, in turn, more effective
than using 4 KB chunks. In our experiments concerning a single protected VM, similarity
compression achieves smaller traffic reductions comparing to gzip and delta compression,
ranging from 12% to 62% reduction using a single-interval hash table and 256 byte chunks.
In these cases, similarity compression can only utilize intra-VM similarities—traffic is re-
duced by removing the duplicate checkpoint contentswithin each VM, since only one VM’s
checkpoints are processed at a time.
Even in the cases of only one protected VM, our results confirm and quantify the intu-
ition that similarity compression is particularly effective for workloads that have multiple
components collaborating on a shared data set. Similarity compression is particularly ef-
fective for HPC-C in the four workloads evaluated. Using only intra-VM similarity and a
single-interval hash table, HPC-C checkpoint traffic is reduced by 47–62% at 1-second and
longer intervals. We initially suspected that much of the reduction comes from the elim-
ination of zero pages, generated upon memory allocations by the workload. An off-line
analysis shows that less than 2.5% of these checkpointed pages contain all zeros. Thus,
similarity compression reduces checkpoint traffic effectively for HPC-C by removing the
non-zero workload data duplicated in the multiple processes spawned by the workload to
collaborate on computation problems.
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Maintaining the hash table across checkpointing interval boundaries improves the ef-
fectiveness of similarity compression, especially when checkpoints are taken at sub-second
intervals. Using a multi-interval hash table, similarity compression not only removes the
checkpoint contents duplicated in the current interval, but also those duplicated with the
dirty page contents in the past intervals. Similarity compression achieves up to 25% addi-
tional traffic reduction by rebuilding the hash table every two intervals, rather than in every
interval. Expanding the hash table further to cover 3 consecutive intervals yields another
10% more traffic reduction, compared to that achieved with a two-interval hash table.
A multi-interval hash table improves traffic reduction especially in short checkpointing
intervals, where dirty pages are likely modified by a small degree—similarity compression
thus finds and eliminates much more checkpoint redundancy when prior page contents are
available in a multi-interval hash table for comparison. Our results also suggest that in
these cases, expanding the time coverage of the hash table improves traffic reductions more
effectively than refining the granularity of the hash table, i.e., detecting redundancy by
smaller chunks. As shown in Figure 2.2, at sub-second intervals, similarity compression
reduces checkpoint traffic more effectively using 1 KB chunks with a two-interval hash
table, comparing to using 256 byte chunks with a single-interval hash table.
2.5.2.1 Multiple Concurrently Protected VMs
We apply the compression methods to the checkpoint traffic of four VMs simultane-
ously, and evaluate the traffic reductions achieved in the following two scenarios: (S1) a
HPC cluster, representative of a homogeneous workload environment, and (S2) A hetero-
geneous mixture of workloads. In S1, each of the four VMs runs an instance of HPC-C.
To introduce realistic workload differences in S1, VM1 and VM2 work independently on
different problem sets, and VM3 and VM4 collaborate on a third, larger set of problems. In
S2, the four VMs run HPC-C, RUBiS, FFmpeg and VoltDB, respectively. In both scenar-
ios, the VMs are co-located in a single protected host, and their checkpoints are captured
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Figure 2.3: The traffic reductions achieved by similarity compression for a HPC-C VM
when the VM’s checkpoints are processed alone (Single-VM), together with
other VMs’ checkpoints in a 4-VM HPC cluster (4-VM), and using a two-
interval hash table (4-VM, 2-intv.)
at the same frequency.
The overall traffic reduction achieved in a multi-VM cluster roughly equals the average
of the traffic reductions achieved for the individual VMs, weighted by the VMs’ respective
checkpoint sizes. This is a good estimate especially for gzip and delta compression, which
process the checkpoint traffic of each VM independently. Similarity compression is the
only method in the three methods evaluated that may achieve additional traffic reductions
when processing checkpoints of multiple VMs concurrently, since inter-VM similarity can
be utilized—dirty page contents duplicated across VM boundaries are also eliminated to
further reduce checkpoint traffic.
To understand the effect of exploiting inter-VM similarity, we select a VM, and compare
the traffic reductions achieved for this VMwhen its checkpoints are processed alone, versus
together with other VMs’ checkpoints in a cluster. This comparison is more reasonable than
simply comparing the overall traffic reductions achieved in single- and multi-VM scenarios,
since that observed in a multi-VM cluster is biased by the individual VMs’ checkpoint
sizes.
We would like to answer the following questions about inter-VM similarity: (1) How
well does inter-VM similarity, when utilized, improve checkpoint traffic reductions in a
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homogeneous workload environment? (2) In a homogeneous workload environment, does
VM collaboration affect the level of inter-VM similarity that is present? (3) How well does
inter-VM similarity and multi-interval hash tables, when used together, improve the effec-
tiveness of similarity compression? (4) Is there any inter-VM similarity in a heterogeneous
workload environment?
Figure 2.3(a) shows the traffic reductions achieved by similarity compression for VM1
in scenario S1, which works on a HPC problem set independently. When its checkpoints
are processed together with the checkpoints of the other three VMs in the cluster, an addi-
tional 2–11% traffic reduction is achieved, compared to processing its checkpoints alone.
Figure 2.3(b) shows the traffic reductions achieved for VM3 in scenario S1, which collab-
orates with another VM in the cluster on the same HPC problem set. Processing this VM’s
checkpoints with the other VMs’ results in greater additional traffic reductions of 11–20%
more; even in short, sub-second intervals, non-trivial amounts of inter-VM similarity and
thus traffic reduction improvements are observed. Exploiting inter-VM similarity with a
two-interval hash table, similarity compression reduces checkpoint traffic by 57–81% for
these VMs, as effectively as gzip.
Similarity compression is effective for homogeneous workload environments, where
non-trivial amounts of inter-VM similarity exist, especially when VMs collaborate on a
common task set. However, limited similarity is found between VMs running heteroge-
neous workloads, for which similarity compression is a poor fit. We found in the workload
mixture of scenario S2 that each VM’s checkpoint traffic is hardly reduced further when
their checkpoints are processed together, compared to processed independently. In the four
VMs in S2, the greatest improvement on traffic reduction is observed for RUBiS to be only
6% more.
Note that the additional traffic reductions achieved by similarity compression in a multi-
VM environment may be considered a lower-bound of the inter-VM similarity present in
the environment, for two reasons. First, one copy of the duplicate contents must be sent over
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Figure 2.4: The CPU cost of checkpoint replication for a single protected VM running
different workloads. No compression is used in the baseline. Delta cache
is 32MB. Similarity compression uses 256 byte chunks with a single-interval
(Sim) and a two-interval (Sim2) hash table.
the network, and is not counted in traffic reduction. Second, some contents are duplicated
both across VM boundaries and within individual VMs, and are already removed when pro-
cessing checkpoints of individual VMs independently. The elimination of these duplicates
is thus not reflected in the additional traffic reduction gained by processing checkpoints of
multiple VMs together.
2.5.3 CPU and Memory Costs
We now examine the resource requirements for each compression method to achieve
the traffic reductions presented in Section 2.5.2.
Figure 2.4 shows the per-page CPU cost of the compression methods measured in the
protected and backup hosts. We show the measurements taken at 100 ms checkpointing
intervals for the single protected VMs running the different workloads; the measurements
in our other experimental cases show consistent trends. In our experiments, checkpoint
replication for each VM can use one CPU core in the protected and backup hosts, respec-
tively. The CPU usage in the protected host is generally larger than that in the backup host,
as shown in Figure 2.4.
While reducing checkpoint traffic effectively, gzip requires significant CPU for compres-
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sion. In the protected host, gzip typically shows an above 80% CPU usage. It incurs the
largest CPU cost in the three methods evaluated. It also uses more CPU when compressing
less effectively: gzip achieves lower traffic reductions at higher CPU costs for FFmpeg and
HPC-C compared to the other workloads. While gzip can operate at a minimal memory
cost—a 4 KB buffer per VM to contain the compression outcome as checkpoints are pro-
cessed page-by-page, its high CPU usage can greatly impact the protected VMs’ normal
operation, especially when checkpoints of multiple protected VMs are processed concur-
rently.
Delta compression uses less CPU for compression than gzip. It typically shows a 70–
80% CPU usage in the protected host. Though it uses fixed-size caches of 16MB and 32MB
in our experiments, we note that for workloads that dirty large areas of memory rapidly,
delta compression can use excessive RAM in the protected host to cache transmitted dirty
pages for effective compression. VoltDB is an example of such workloads. At 1-second and
longer intervals, delta compression cannot reduce VoltDB’s checkpoint traffic at all using
16MB and 32MB caches. To achieve reasonable traffic reductions in these cases, up to
400MB of memory is required for the delta cache, since as discussed in Section 2.5.2, delta
compression needs a cache larger than the average checkpoint size to reduce checkpoint
traffic by more than 40%. If a few such VMs are protected at the same time, the total
memory consumption of delta compression can grow quickly and create memory pressure
in the protected host.
In the three methods evaluated, similarity compression uses CPU most efficiently. Typ-
ically, it shows a 50–60% CPU usage in the protected host. Higher CPU costs are incurred
when checkpoints are processed by smaller chunks, since more MD5 digests are computed
for each dirty page. But even when using 256 byte chunks (computing 16 digests per page),
its CPU cost is the lowest of the three methods evaluated. Similarity compression also uses
little CPU in the backup host, since it “decompresses” checkpoints simply by copying du-
plicate contents from reference chunks, requiring no additional computations. In some
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(b) A two-interval hash table
Figure 2.5: The memory cost of similarity compression using 256 byte chunks.
cases, it even uses less CPU than receiving and storing uncompressed checkpoints in the
backup (the baseline), thanks to the reduced checkpoint data sizes.
Similarity compression requires memory in the protected host for the hash table. The
hash table installs one entry for each unique chunk processed, so it uses more memory as
more unique chunks are recorded. Figure 2.5(a) shows the memory cost of similarity com-
pression with a single-interval hash table. In the four workloads, similarity compression
incurs the smallest memory costs for HPC-C and the largest memory costs for VoltDB. It
uses up to 20 MB of memory to record the chunk contents of the large VoltDB checkpoints
in the hash table. For the other three workloads, it incurs low memory overheads, ranging
from 95 KB to 1.3 MB when using 256 byte chunks, and less (8–350 KB) when 1 KB and
4 KB chunks are used.
Similarity compression uses memory more efficiently in the presence of greater VM
similarity, since fewer unique chunks need to be stored in the hash table. In our 4-VMHPC
cluster (scenario S1 in Section 2.5.2.1), it uses less than 2 MB of memory at all times to
process the checkpoints of all four VMs concurrently with a single-interval hash table, and
is able to reduce checkpoint traffic effectively thanks to the significant intra- and inter-VM
similarity present in the cluster. However, in the workload mixture of scenario S2, it uses
up to 22 MB of memory with most entries in the hash table recording the unique contents
of the large VoltDB checkpoints.
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Figure 2.6: The checkpoint transfer time of a single protected VM running different work-
loads.
Larger memory costs are incurred when similarity compression uses a two-interval hash
table, as shown in Figure 2.5(b), since additional memory in the backup is required to cache
the unique chunks in the previous interval for possible references; this cache constitutes the
main part of the memory consumptions. In the HPC cluster of scenario S1, using a two-
interval hash table improves traffic reduction—similarity compression reduces checkpoint
traffic by up to 81%, at a moderate memory cost of 2–18 MB. However, in a heterogeneous
workload environment, like the workload mixture in scenario S2, a multi-interval hash table
may not be suitable. Since limited VM similarity exists in such an environment, a multi-
interval hash table may likely incur a large memory overhead by caching unique checkpoint
contents in the backup, without effectively improving traffic reduction.
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2.5.4 Checkpoint Transfer and Storage Time
In addition to consuming resources, checkpoint compression affects the time taken to
transfer and store each checkpoint. Figure 2.6 shows the average checkpoint transfer time
incurred by a single protected VM running the different workloads. For all workloads,
transfer time is the shortest when compression is not used (the baseline), ranging from 16
to 188 ms except for VoltDB; VoltDB checkpoints are larger and each takes much longer
to finish replication.
In these experiments concerning a single protected VM, uncompressed VM check-
points are usually replicated within each configured interval, unless the intervals are 50
ms and shorter. Take FFmpeg as an example. When checkpointed every 50 and 25 ms,
an uncompressed checkpoint takes an average of 61 and 49 ms, respectively, to replicate.
Since each checkpoint does not finish replication within the configured interval time, sub-
sequent checkpoints must be delayed, and the configured checkpointing frequencies (one
checkpoint every 50 and 25 ms) are not achieved. For VoltDB, even lower frequency of
checkpointing every 1 second cannot be achieved.
Compression lengthens the checkpoint transfer time incurred by the single protected
VMs, and gzip requires the longest transfer times in the three methods evaluated. Figure 2.7
plots the ratio of the measured transfer time in Figure 2.6 to the configured checkpointing
interval. A ratio greater than 1 indicates that the elapsed time between two consecutive
checkpoints is larger than the configured interval length, and the configured checkpointing
frequency is not achieved. Even though gzip sends only 20–60% of the original checkpoint
data over the network, it incurs transfer times up to 14x longer than the configured check-
pointing interval, due to performing compression. As a result, for VoltDB, none of the
checkpointing frequencies evaluated can be achieved, and for all other workloads, check-
pointing every 100 ms and higher frequencies are no longer feasible when gzip is used.
The long checkpoint transfer times required by gzip can limit its applicability for server
applications that are very sensitive to network latencies.
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Figure 2.7: The ratio of the measured transfer time in Figure 2.6 to the configured check-
pointing interval.
Similarity compression requires the shortest checkpoint transfer times for the single
protected VMs, as well as the shortest checkpoint storage times in the three methods eval-
uated. It takes 1.5x less time than delta compression to replicate each checkpoint of the
protected VM using 256 byte chunks and a single-interval hash table. Even shorter transfer
times are required when processing checkpoints by larger chunks and a multi-interval hash
table. It also stores each replicated checkpoint to the fail-over image as fast as if compres-
sion were not used, incurring almost the same amount of checkpoint storage time as in the
baseline cases, as Figure 2.8 shows.
Checkpoint decompression of gzip and delta compression takes a non-trivial amount of
time to complete, resulting in prolonged checkpoint storage times and lowering the check-
pointing frequency actually achieved. In our experiments, gzip and delta compression incur
up to 10x and 13x longer storage times compared to similarity compression, respectively.
33
  0
  50
  100
  150
  200
  250
hpcc rubis ffmpeg voltdb
St
or
ag
e 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s) Baseline
gzip
D−32M
Sim−256B
Figure 2.8: The storage time of each checkpoint of a single protected VM running different
workloads.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
25 50 100 1000 2000 5000
Tr
an
sf
er
 T
im
e 
(m
s)
Checkpointing Interval (ms)
gzip
delta-32M
sim-256B
baseline
(a) In a HPC cluster
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
25 50 100 1000 2000 5000
Tr
an
sf
er
 T
im
e 
(m
s)
Checkpointing Interval (ms)
(b) In a workload mixture
Figure 2.9: The checkpoint transfer time of a HPC-C VM measured in our 4-VM HPC
cluster and workload mixture scenarios.
We observed that using the two methods, replication of a subsequent checkpoint is often
delayed by the previous checkpoint not being completely stored and releasing its buffer
in time for a new incoming checkpoint, especially when checkpoints are configured to be
replicated at sub-second intervals. The checkpointing frequencies actually achieved thus
decrease.
2.5.4.1 Transfer Time in Multi-VM Environments
To understand how checkpoint transfer time varies when multiple VMs are concur-
rently protected, we consider the transfer times incurred by a HPC-C VM in our multi-VM
experimental scenarios S1 and S2, the HPC cluster and workload mixture, as shown in
Figure 2.9.
While gzip consistently requires long transfer times, those incurred by similarity com-
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pression show an interesting variation. As discussed above, similarity compression requires
the shortest transfer times in the three methods evaluated for the single protected VMs run-
ning different workloads. This observation remains true in our various experiments with
a 2-VM HPC cluster. However, as the number of VMs in the HPC cluster increases to 4
(scenario S1), in some cases, the transfer times incurred by delta compression become the
shortest. In the workload mixture (scenario S2), similarity compression even takes as long
as gzip to replicate each checkpoint.
These results suggest that similarity compression may lose the advantage of requiring
small checkpoint transfer times as the number of concurrently protected VMs increases, and
we have found that this is the case when the target environment is bottlenecked on network
bandwidth, but not CPU, as we will discuss below. Our testbed happens to represent such
a computing environment.
Checkpoint transfer time consists of processing time, during which dirty pages are com-
pressed, and sending time, during which the pages are transferred over the network. Com-
pression lengthens processing time while reducing sending time, and the two components
vary by different degrees for different compression methods. A computation-intensive
method can greatly increase processing time, while an effective method greatly reduces
sending time. The resource availability in the target environment also impacts the two
components in different ways: abundant CPU improves processing time, while faster net-
work improves sending time.
In an environment with limited network bandwidth (assuming abundant CPU), send-
ing time plays a more important role than processing time in the variation of checkpoint
transfer time. Using an effective method like gzip, less dirty data is sent for each protected
VM, and as the number of VMs increases, sending time grows more gently. By contrast,
since similarity compression reduces traffic less effectively, with more VMs concurrently
protected, sending time increases more rapidly. As a result, similarity compression may
begin to require longer transfer times than the other methods when the network becomes
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Figure 2.10: The breakdown of the checkpoint transfer times of a HPC-C VM measured in
our HPC clusters consisting of 1, 2 and 4 VMs.
saturated.
We verify this reasoning by breaking down the transfer time measurements into pro-
cessing time and sending time. We estimate the (elapsed) processing time by the average
CPU time spent for each checkpoint. This estimate is reasonable, since there is minimal
CPU sharing in our testbed: when emulhacp spawns four threads to replicate checkpoints
for 4 VMs in parallel, CPU is almost always available to the threads in our server, which
has 4 physical cores. We then consider the remainder of the transfer time as sending time,
which is a lower-bound of the time required to send the dirty data (the part not overlapping
with processing time).
Figure 2.10 shows the breakdowns of the transfer times incurred for a HPC-C VMmea-
sured in a HPC cluster consisting of 1, 2, and 4 VMs; we show the breakdowns in cases
of 1 second and 100 ms checkpointing intervals as an example. While similarity compres-
sion requires the shortest processing time, as the number of VMs increases, its sending
time grows by a larger degree comparing to gzip and delta compression. Comparing Fig-
ure 2.10(a) with Figure 2.10(b), the sending time of similarity compression also increases
more significantly in the cases of longer checkpointing intervals, where a larger amount of
checkpoint data is generated in the network in each interval. Therefore, similarity compres-
sion requires longer transfer times than delta compression when the network is saturated to
a certain degree. As the amount of checkpoint traffic keeps increasing, similarity compres-
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sion may take as long as gzip, or even longer, to replicate each checkpoint.
2.6 Discussions on Compression Method Selections
From our evaluation, one can hardly find a single best compression solution, and com-
pression methods should be selected based on the workload types and resource constraints
in the target environment.
Our results suggest that similarity compression is the most suitable for VM clusters run-
ning homogeneous workloads, especially when VMs in the cluster collaborate on a shared
task set. In these scenarios, similarity compression achieves satisfactory traffic reductions
using both CPU and memory efficiently, and it becomes even more effective with a multi-
interval hash table. For example, using a two-interval hash table in our 4-VM HPC cluster
yields up to 32% more traffic reduction than a single-interval hash table would achieve,
without incurring an undue resource overhead. The additional traffic reduction also helps
shorten checkpoint transfer time further; similarity compression regains the advantage of
requiring the shortest transfer time in the three methods evaluated with a two-interval hash
table in our HPC cluster. Note, however, that maintaining the hash table across many in-
tervals may not be necessary, since the additional traffic reductions gained decrease with
increasing resource costs.
For other workload scenarios, especially a heterogeneous mixture of workloads, gzip
and delta compression are better suited. These methods are effective for a wider range of
workload types than similarity compression. When using them, the resource availability in
the target environment must be considered.
To use gzip, the protected host must have abundant CPU to support checkpoint com-
pression in addition to normal operation of protected VMs and applications. Since gzip
generally reduces checkpoint traffic effectively at a high CPU cost, it is bottlenecked on
checkpoint compression rather than transmission. If processing checkpoints of multiple
VMs creates severe CPU contention in the protected host, the usefulness of gzip can de-
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grade. In such a case, not only are VM operations in the protected host affected, each
checkpoint of the protected VMs also takes longer to replicate. Consequently, the VMs
must be checkpointed at lower frequencies, and this can potentially make gzip unusable for
VMs running latency-sensitive server applications.
For delta compression to be effective, sufficient memory must be available and provi-
sioned for the delta cache. Our results showminimal traffic reductions when the delta cache
is smaller than the average checkpoint size of the protected VM. It is thus critical to prop-
erly size the delta cache according to the memory access behavior of the target workloads
and the checkpointing frequencies used. A proper cache size may be determined by pro-
filing the target workloads a priori. Alternatively, the cache may first be over-provisioned
and then dynamically adjusted as the workloads execute.
2.7 Related Work
This chapter examines the prohibitive network requirements of checkpoint replication.
Two types of approaches have been proposed to reduce checkpoint replication traffic in HA
systems. One reduces the amount of VM state to protect/checkpoint; the other checkpoints
the full VM state, but reduces the amount of data sent for each checkpoint taken.
RemusDB [69], a highly available database system in VM, uses the first approach.
It does not checkpoint clean disk buffers, and “de-protects” certain data structures in the
database system that can be regenerated after a failure. Therefore, it creates smaller check-
points and less replication traffic in the network. However, it requires in-depth understand-
ing of the applications running in a protected VM to identify data structures that can be
safely de-protected. The VM and applications must also be instrumented to recover un-
checkpointed state after a fail-over.
Checkpoint compression exemplifies the second type of approach. Compression is gen-
erally applicable regardless of the applications in the VMs, and requires less system instru-
mentation; hence we focus on compression in our study presented in this chapter. The
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authors of [39] briefly discussed compressing checkpoints by gzip and delta compression,
although a thorough evaluation was not included. RemusDB [69] and SecondSite [80],
designed for database HA and datacenter disaster recovery, respectively, use delta com-
pression in their systems. They both find page delta by XOR, and compress the delta by
RLE, like evaluated in this chapter. Lu et al. propose fine-grained dirty region tracking
(FDRT) [64], which shares the same concept of delta compression. FDRT divides each
dirty page into fixed-size regions, and finds the regions that are actually modified by com-
paring content hashes. It then replicates the modified regions to the backup instead of
the entire page. While delta compression has been used in HA systems and during live
VM migration [92, 97], our study compares it with other types of compression methods to
understand when it is best suited for use.
Similarity compression exploits memory content redundancy to reduce checkpoint repli-
cation traffic. In a broader context, content redundancy is widely used for storage dedupli-
cation to improve I/O performance [59, 78, 81], and in network infrastructures to improve
network capacity and end-to-end application performance [27, 28]. Content redundancy
in VM memory is often utilized to share identical pages and reduce host memory pres-
sure [49, 70, 96]. Different from these systems, which find and coalesce redundant pages
in the entire memory space of co-located VMs, similarity compression finds redundant
data in dirtied memory pages. It also detects redundancy much more frequently than these
systems as well as VM migration systems that use redundancy elimination [82, 87, 97].
Gerofi et al. presents another way to utilize VM similarity and reduce checkpoint repli-
cation traffic [48]. Instead of finding “identical” data in dirty pages, the authors find mem-
ory areas that are “similar” to the dirty pages, and send only the differences between the
dirty pages and these memory areas over the network; their approach is currently applied
to each VM independently. The same idea has also been used to reduce VM migration
traffic [42, 99]. Note that similarity compression examines the content similarity in the
memory space of live, executing VMs, in contrast to systems like VMFlock [25], which
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utilize the similarity in VM disks to reduce the traffic incurred for migrating static VM disk
images.
2.8 Conclusions
Reducing checkpoint traffic is crucial to using checkpoint replication for maintaining
VM availability. Although checkpoint compression methods are available, they have not
been thoroughly evaluated and compared in the context of supporting HA. In this chapter,
we conducted a detailed characterization of three checkpoint compression methods, gzip,
delta compression, and similarity compression, based on their effectiveness and overheads.
Our evaluation uncovered the different strengths and weaknesses of each method, and pro-
vided guidelines for selecting and using these methods based on the workload types and
resource constraints in a HA system. The evaluation framework developed in this chapter
is generic, and can be used to evaluate other compression methods.
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CHAPTER III
HydraVM: Memory-Efficient High-Availability for
Virtual Machines
3.1 Introduction
To restore a failed VM and resume its execution from where it left off in the failure,
existing approaches create a backup VM in a separate host for each primary running VM,
and synchronize a primary VM’s runtime state to its backup by replaying VM instruc-
tions [20, 32] or replicating VM checkpoints [24, 39, 44, 47, 93]. The backup stands by in
the background until a failure of the primary occurs, at which point it becomes active and
takes over execution from the primary’s state before the failure.
Using backup VMs, existing HA approaches reduce the amount of completed work lost
upon failures, but at a high resource cost. In particular, each backup VM reserves as much
memory as its primary. This reserved memory space cannot be used by other VMs even
though the backup remains inactive during normal VM operations. Making backup mem-
ory reservation is expensive for several reasons. First, each VM that desires HA support
incurs a 100% memory overhead without any increase in its system throughput. Second,
the aggregate backup memory reservation made for a group of protected VMs can sig-
nificantly and unproductively consume RAM, a scarce and expensive resource. Third, as
many-core processors become pervasive, memory is increasingly the resource bottleneck
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of VM consolidation [49]. Inactively blocking host memory for backup VMs may hinder
effective consolidation of active running VMs, and result in under-utilization of other host
resources (e.g., CPU cores) and degradation of the overall resource efficiency in a virtual-
ized environment.
In this chapter, we propose HydraVM, a memory-efficient HA approach for VMs. The
primary objective of HydraVM is to protect VMs against failures of their hosting machines
without any backup memory reservation. Instead of creating a backup VM, HydraVM
keeps track of the runtime state of a protected VM in a fail-over imagemaintained in a net-
worked, shared storage, which is commonly deployed in a virtualized environment to hold
VM disks and facilitate VM management and migration. In case of a failure, HydraVM
quickly restores the VM from the fail-over image and resumes its execution.
HydraVM keeps track of VM runtime state by taking incremental VM checkpoints, as
existing HA systems do [24, 39, 44, 47, 93]. Different from existing systems, which store
the checkpoints taken in an in-memory backup VM, HydraVM consolidates the check-
points in a shared storage. HydraVM utilizes inexpensive storage, and frees up expensive
RAM for better usage. A failed VM can be recovered in any host that has sufficient re-
sources, since HydraVM maintains the VM state needed by fail-over in a shared storage
instead of a dedicated backup host. However, fast VM recovery is challenging for Hy-
draVM, since the fail-over state must be loaded from the shared storage. To bring a failed
VM back alive quickly, HydraVM performs a slim VM restore, which loads only a small
amount of critical VM state from the fail-over image to restore a VM, and activates the ex-
ecution of the restored VM immediately. As the VM executes, the VM state not yet loaded
is supplied on-demand.
HydraVM was not intended to provide “hot mirroring” of VM state as existing ap-
proaches that use in-memory backup VMs do, since each VM checkpoint takes longer to
store on a storage device than in memory. With hot mirroring, existing approaches buffer,
and checkpoint, VM network outputs before releasing them, to provide transparent failure
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recovery for client-facing applications. However, even with hot mirroring, latency-sensitive
applications can suffer from significant performance degradations due to network buffer-
ing [39, 44]. HydraVM does not buffer network outputs for protected VMs with its “warm
mirroring” of VM state, and therefore, does not provide transparent recovery for server
applications. We make this tradeoff to maintain fail-over VM state in inexpensive storage,
and provide a cost-effective HA alternative for applications which do not require network
buffering, including long-running computation jobs and distributed applications that run in
a VM cluster. These applications benefit from the protection of HydraVM at a reduced
resource cost without requiring any modification.
We implemented HydraVM based on Xen, and evaluated it using workloads that may
benefit from HydraVM. Our results show that HydraVM provides VM protection at a low
overhead, and can recover a failed VM within 2.2 seconds. While the individual techniques
used in HydraVM have been applied to different problems, the contribution of this chapter
is a new combination of the techniques that solves the real-world problem of providing
resource-efficient HA support for VMs and the demonstration of the applicability of this
solution. Our aim is not to replace existing HA approaches that use in-memory backups—
they are needed especially for client-facing applications to benefit from transparent failure
recovery, but rather to complement the HA toolbox currently available with a cost-effective
alternative.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the design
rationale, and provides an overview of HydraVM. Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 detail the
VM protection and recovery mechanisms in HydraVM, respectively. Section 3.5 evaluates
HydraVM experimentally. Section 3.6 discusses alternative storage architectures that Hy-
draVM may take advantage of, especially in large environments. Section 3.7 summarizes
related work, and the chapter concludes with Section 3.8.
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3.2 HydraVM Design
The design of HydraVM is based on a key observation that existing HA approaches
incur a high cost by maintaining backup VMs in memory. It is our primary objective to
reduce backup memory reservation and provide a memory-efficient HA alternative.
3.2.1 Storage-based VM High-Availability
One may consider downsizing backup memory reservation by memory ballooning [96].
Ballooning is designed for adjusting VM memory allocation at runtime, and requires the
VM to cooperate. It is very challenging for a backup VM to exercise its balloon driver,
since the backup may not be operational, and its state changes must follow that of the
protected VM very closely.
Another way to reduce the overhead of backup memory reservation is to make the
memory usable for other actively running VMs, i.e., to time-share a backup VM’s memory
space with other VMs in the host. To do this, a host-wide paging system may be needed to
schedule physical page frames between hosted VMs. Unfortunately, since this extra level
of paging can introduce performance anomalies due to unintended interactions with the
paging system in the guest OS [96], current platform virtualization technologies, such as
Xen and VMware ESX, either do not support, or do not prefer host-wide paging. It is thus
difficult to let other running VMs use the memory reserved by a backup.
A third alternative is to page out backup VMs [34], reclaim their memory and re-
distribute to active VMs. This approach appears feasible, since a backup VM remains
inactive until the protected VM fails. However, to be able to take over execution from
where the protected VM left off in the event of a failure, the backup needs to be swapped in
very frequently to synchronize with the execution state of the protected VM. This overhead
is non-trivial, and can offset the resource benefits gained by swapping the backup out.
HydraVM “pages out” the backup VM to eliminate the unproductive reservation of
backup memory, and shortcuts the state synchronization process by updating the backup’s
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on-disk pages without paging them back in. In other words, HydraVM takes a storage-
based approach. Instead of reserving memory in an additional server, we “maintain” the
backup VM in a stable storage. For each protected (primary) VM, HydraVM maintains in
a networked, shared storage the state needed by fail-over, based on which a backup VM
can be quickly restored and activated to take over execution when the primary fails. The
storage system holding the VM fail-over states is assumed to be fail-independent of and
accessible from the physical servers that host VMs.
Rather than adding a new shared storage into a virtualized environment for the sole pur-
pose of providing VM protection, HydraVM utilizes the one that is already installed—the
shared storage commonly deployed as a central store for VM images. This shared storage
may be provisioned in various ways in practice, to deliver the aggregate capacity and com-
bined throughput of a federation of devices and meet the I/O demands of all VMs running
in the environment. For example, it may be a shared block storage accessed via a Fibre
Channel or iSCSI-based storage area network (SAN), or a cluster filesystem. To ensure
undisrupted accesses to VM data, this storage is usually built with redundant connections
to and from the VM hosts, as well as storage-level reliability mechanisms against device
and controller failures. HydraVM depends on these properties to assume the reliability and
availability of the shared storage, and focuses on maintaining VM availability in the face
of VM host failures.
3.2.2 An Overview of HydraVM
HydraVM is designed to provide VM protection from fail-stop host failures. It does not
attempt to recover VM execution from non-fail-stop conditions caused by configuration
errors, software bugs, and so on.
HydraVM has two operation modes, protection and recovery. We give a brief overview
of HydraVM below, and detail its two operation modes in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4,
respectively.
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During normal operation of a primary VM, HydraVM operates in the protection mode.
HydraVM maintains a backup copy of the primary VM state in a shared storage. As the
primary executes, the backup state is periodically synchronized with the changing state in
the VM, such that in the event of a primary host failure, the VM can be recovered based on
its backup state without losing much of the completed work. Like existing approaches [24,
39, 44, 47, 93], HydraVM replicates checkpoints of the primary VM to update the backup
VM state. Unlike previous systems, HydraVM consolidates and stores the checkpoints in
storage, without making any backup memory reservation.
Upon detection of a failure of the primary host, HydraVM switches to the recovery
mode and responds to the failure. A restoration host with available memory must be se-
lected, either from the stand-by hosts, or from the surviving hosts. HydraVM then initiates
a fail-over to restore the failed primary VM in the restoration host. HydraVM performs a
“slim” VM restore, which loads only a small amount of critical VM state from the shared
storage to instantiate and restore the VM. It activates the restored VM immediately to take
over execution from the most recent runtime state recorded before the failure. As the VM
executes, the state not loaded during fail-over is supplied on-demand.
We implemented the protection and recovery mechanisms of HydraVM based on Xen
(version 3.3.2) as management commands to be invoked via the xm interface. Currently,
HydraVM does not implement custom-built mechanisms to detect host failures and select
restoration hosts, and assumes to cooperate with and be informed by existing failure detec-
tors (e.g., [83]) and cluster resource managers (e.g., [19, 100]) of these decisions.
3.2.3 Advantages and Limitations
The storage-based HydraVM approach offers several advantages. First, by using in-
expensive storage to maintain the VM state necessary for fail-over in place of expensive
RAM, the hardware costs of providing HA support are reduced. Second, the memory re-
served by inactive backup VMs are freed up for better usage. They may be added to active
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VMs for performance enhancements, or used to create new VMs and consolidate existing
ones more effectively. Third, since HydraVMmaintains the fail-over states in a shared stor-
age instead of dedicated backup machines, in the event of a failure, the affected VMs may
be recovered in any physical host that has access to the storage. This allows fail-over to any
host that currently has sufficient spare memory and other resources. This ability is critical
given the highly variable utilization of hosts in a virtualized environment. Finally, using
HydraVM, a relatively small number of spare hosts needs to be provisioned in anticipation
of failures, instead of a large number of hosts passively synchronized with the protected
VMs, since a single host can now back up or protect many more VMs, as long as they do
not all fail together.
However, maintaining fail-over state in storage also causes limitations for HydraVM,
mainly because persistent storage devices are orders of magnitudes slower than RAM.
When maintaining backup VMs in memory, the primary and backup can be synchro-
nized quickly and frequently, or kept in lock-step, even though significant overheads are
incurred [32, 39, 44]. In HydraVM, each synchronization of the primary and backup VM
state takes much longer to finish on storage devices. HydraVM thus has to replicate VM
checkpoints and update backup VM state much less frequently than approaches using in-
memory backup VMs.
Previous approaches use in-memory backup VMs and frequent checkpointing mainly
to enable network buffering. Network buffering is the act of withholding outgoing net-
work packets of the primary VM until the checkpoint that captures the state from which
the packets are generated is fully replicated and acknowledged by the backup. Frequent
checkpointing is necessary, since network outputs must be released frequently after each
checkpoint to not incur unacceptably long delays. However, even when checkpoints are
taken and replicated as frequently as 10–40 times per second, latency-sensitive applica-
tions still suffer from significant performance degradations [39, 44].
Network buffering ensures that any exposed state is recoverable if a failure occurs, and
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is needed when the protected VM interacts with external clients and transparent failure
recovery is required. However, for most client-facing applications, any storage-based HA
approach does not replicate checkpoints frequently enough to sustain reasonable applica-
tion performance with network buffering. HydraVM currently does not buffer network
outputs for protected VMs, and does not provide transparent recovery for server applica-
tions constantly interacting with external clients. Without cooperation from the end-user or
programmer during recovery, server applications should be protected by in-memory backup
VMs with network buffering, even though at larger application and resource overheads.
HydraVM makes this design tradeoff to maintain the state needed by VM fail-over in
storage, instead of RAM, and provide a cost-effective HA alternative for application sce-
narios in which frequent checkpointing and network buffering are not needed. HydraVM
protects long-running computing jobs which can be prohibitively expensive to repeat af-
ter a failure occurs, such as scientific computation and simulation, at a reduced resource
cost and without requiring any modification to the application. In a cluster, HydraVM can
work with distributed snapshot algorithms [46] to provide coordinated protection and re-
covery for VMs running distributed and multi-tiered applications. Alternatively, HydraVM
can work with synchronized clocks to checkpoint and protect multiple VMs in a cluster
concurrently.
3.3 VM Protection
During normal execution of a primary VM, HydraVM maintains a backup copy of the
VM state in a shared storage, and updates the backup state continuously as the primary
runs.
There are two main approaches to primary-backup state synchronization. Log-and-
replay records all instructions and non-deterministic events executed by the primary VM,
and replays them deterministically to generate an identical state in the backup [20, 32]. This
approach is not suitable for HydraVM, since by maintaining the backup state in a storage,
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Figure 3.1: The HydraVM system.
we essentially page out the entire backup VM, and to replay primary VM execution would
require frequently bringing pages of the backup VM back in. Therefore, HydraVM uses
the other approach, checkpoint replication [24, 39, 44, 47, 93], which captures the entire
state of the primary VM in checkpoints and replicates them to the backup.
3.3.1 Checkpointing VM CPU and Memory State
Figure 3.1 illustrates the architecture of HydraVM. For each primary VM, HydraVM
runs a checkpointing daemon, called hacp, to enforce the protection of the VM. hacp first
creates a fail-over image for the VM by taking a full VM checkpoint and replicating it to
the fail-over image storage; this full checkpoint is taken only once at the beginning of the
protection. The fail-over image contains the backup state of the VM, based on which the
VM can be restored in case a failure occurs. Specifically, a fail-over image contains (1) the
configuration of the VM describing the VM’s allocated resources, virtual devices, pages
shared with the hypervisor, and so on, (2) the VM’s virtual CPU state, and (3) all memory
pages of the VM, laid out sequentially in the order they appear in the VM’s memory space.
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In our implementation, (1) and (2) contain only 60 KB of data, so the size of the fail-over
image is just slightly larger than the memory size of the VM.
As the VM continues executing, hacp takes incremental checkpoints periodically. Each
incremental checkpoint captures the changes of the VM’s CPU and memory state since the
last checkpoint taken. We implemented hacp by modifying the stop-and-copy stage of
Xen’s live migration support [38]. hacp uses Xen’s shadow page tables to find the memory
pages modified in each checkpointing interval, by putting the execution of a primary VM
in log-dirtymode. In this mode of operation, Xen maintains a private (shadow) copy of the
VM’s page tables, in which all pages of the VM are marked read-only. A write to a page
generates a fault and traps into Xen, so Xen can record the page in a dirty bitmap.
At the end of each checkpointing interval, hacp pauses the VMmomentarily to capture
a consistent set of changed VM state while the VM is not executing. It finds the dirty
memory pages based on the dirty bitmap, and copies their contents along with the CPU state
of the VM to a buffer. It then resets the dirty bitmap to record for the next checkpoint, and
un-pauses the VM. While the VM continues executing, hacp sends the buffer containing
the checkpointed VM state to the fail-over image storage.
HydraVM replicates each checkpoint asynchronously, overlapping checkpoint replica-
tion with VM execution as existing HA systems do [39, 44, 47]. Unlike previous systems,
which store checkpoints in server memory, HydraVM writes checkpoints to storage. A
checkpoint may be stored as an individual patch file, or merged with the fail-over image
in the shared storage. The first approach may store the checkpoint faster with sequential
I/Os, but checkpoint patches can consume storage space very rapidly as the VM continues
running. In our experiments, we observed that a workload can dirty 10–40MB of memory
per second. Using these results as an example, protection of a VM can generate 36–144GB
of checkpoint data per hour, and potentially use up an entire disk per day.
The checkpoint patches need to be consolidated to reclaim storage space and to generate
a recent, consistent VM state for fail-over. However, merging checkpoint patches is very
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time-consuming. Each patch file must be read from disk, and the dirty page contents written
to different locations in the fail-over image according to the page indexes. Our experience
suggests that merging only 80 checkpoints or so, each containing about 30MB of data,
takes almost 4 minutes to complete. For a workload that dirties 30MB of memory per
second, to merge all its checkpoints when restoration of the VM is required would result
in an unacceptably long fail-over time. Even if a daemon runs to merge a few checkpoints
periodically, the I/Os incurred can interfere with the storage of new incoming checkpoints,
and offset the speed benefit of writing checkpoints sequentially as patches.
Therefore, HydraVM takes the other approach, to consolidate an incoming checkpoint
into the fail-over image, and keep the image updated with the latest checkpointed VM
state, ready for use by VM restoration. For each primary VM, HydraVM runs a checkpoint
receiver daemon, harcv, in the fail-over image storage. harcv receives a checkpoint in
its entirety, and applies all state changes included in the checkpoint to the fail-over image.
Note that harcv does not write to the fail-over image while receiving the checkpoint, nor
does hacp update the fail-over image directly by sending checkpointed VM state in network
file or block I/Os. Otherwise, the fail-over image may become inconsistent and unusable
for recovery, if the primary host fails in the middle of transmitting a checkpoint.
harcv commits all checkpoint writes to the storage, releases the buffer cache used, and
sends an ACK back to hacp, confirming the successful completion of the checkpoint. After
receiving the ACK, hacp waits until the current checkpointing interval ends, and takes a
checkpoint again. If a checkpoint takes a longer time than the configured checkpointing
interval to replicate, hacp waits until the on-going replication finishes and an ACK is re-
ceived, and then starts the next checkpoint. This way, checkpoints are not taken faster than
they can be stored and made useful (in the fail-over image).
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3.3.2 Checkpointing VM Disk State
To correctly restore the primary VM in the event of a failure, a VM disk state that is
consistent with its CPU and memory state in the fail-over image is required. The focus of
HydraVM is to keep track of and recover VM runtime state in a memory-efficient manner,
and we currently use a simple technique to meet the requirement of checkpointing virtual
disk state. Our system hosts VM disks under LVM [12], and uses the snapshot functionality
of LVM to capture the disk state at the time of an incremental checkpoint.
LVM snapshots can be taken very quickly and at a low overhead. It is implemented
by performing copy-on-write at block level. Note that HydraVM is not designed for, nor
confined to, the use of LVM. File system snapshots, such as those supported in ZFS [85],
BTRFS [84], Ext3cow [76], to name a few, can also be used. It is most ideal to integrate
HydraVM with a storage infrastructure that is designed to support efficient creation of
virtual disk snapshots; one good example of such a storage system is Parallax [67].
3.4 VM Recovery
For prior approaches that use in-memory backup VMs, when a failure occurs, all VM
states needed for fail-over are in place in the memory of the backup VM. Ideally, fail-
over can be accomplished simply by switching on backup VM execution. However, quick
restoration of a failed VM is challenging in HydraVM, since the fail-over image is kept on
a networked stable storage, and must be loaded into the memory of the selected restoration
host before the VM can resume execution from the last checkpointed state.
Loading the entire fail-over image of a VM can take an unacceptably long time. It
takes 20–40 seconds to load a single fail-over image of 1–2GB from a hard drive and
send it over a GbE link to the restoration host in our experiments, and it will take even
longer to load a larger fail-over image or multiple images at a time. Loading large amounts
of VM state from the fail-over image can also make VM restoration a highly variable
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procedure, especially when restoring multiple VMs concurrently: even a small VM which
may individually restore acceptably can require an unpredictably long fail-over time, due
to the aggregate network and storage traffic incurred. It is therefore important to reduce the
time and traffic incurred for VM fail-over.
3.4.1 Slim VM Restore
HydraVM performs a “slim” restore for a failed VM to quickly instantiate the VM in
the restoration host based on a minimal set of information in the fail-over image. The
execution of the VM is activated immediately after the instantiation, without waiting for
the fail-over image to be fully loaded.
The restoration agent hart is invoked in the restoration host, and is responsible for
performing the fail-over. hart first loads the VM configuration from the fail-over image,
which describes the allocated resources and virtual devices of the failed VM. Based on
this information, hart reserves sufficient memory in the host, constructs a VM container,
establishes communication channels between the VM container and the hypervisor, and
creates the virtual devices used by the VM. We recycled Xen’s code for VM restore to
implement this stage of slim restore.
Although sufficient memory is reserved in the restoration host when hart creates the
VM container, physical page frames that constitute the memory area are not yet designated
when the memory reservation is made. hart loads the VM page tables from the fail-
over image. It walks through the page table entries, allocates and assigns physical page
frames in the restoration host to VM pages. This establishes the mappings between guest
page frame numbers (GPFNs), which are the page indexes in the VM’s private view of
its contiguous memory space, and machine frame numbers (MFNs), which are the host-
dependent physical frame numbers in the restoration host. The VM page tables are updated
to contain correct references to the allocated memory of the VM in the restoration host.
Subsequently, hart loads several VM data structures that are critical to restoring VM
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execution, for example, the running virtual CPU, wall-clock time, and a few pages shared
with the hypervisor. Finally, hart loads the virtual CPU state. With the above information
loaded from the fail-over image storage and a consistent virtual disk state in the VM disk
storage, hart restores the VM, reconnects the virtual devices to the restored VM, and
switches on VM execution.
3.4.2 Fetching VM Pages On-demand
Immediately after the restored VM begins to execute, its memory space is partially
populated. Only the small set of VM pages loaded by slim restore is placed in the memory
space of the restored VM and is ready for use; no data pages of the VM are loaded during
fail-over.
As the restored VM executes and accesses its memory, valid contents must be supplied
for the execution to proceed. In HydraVM, memory references made by the restored VM
are intercepted by the hypervisor. If a page accessed is not yet present in the memory space
of the VM, the hypervisor requests on the VM’s behalf that the page content be fetched
from the fail-over image.
VM memory references may be intercepted in different ways. One approach is to mark
all resident pages in the VM as “not-present” in their page table entries when loading VM
page tables during slim restore, so that when the VM accesses a page, it generates a fault
and traps into the hypervisor. However, this approach requires significant modification in
the guest kernel to work. Our implementation uses Xen’s support of shadow page tables in-
stead. Before finishing slim restore, hart puts the operation of the restored VM in shadow
mode. The shadow copy of the VM page tables are initially empty, and therefore, the first
access to each VM page traps into Xen upon a fault; the shadow entries are filled in as Xen
handles these faults during VM execution.
When the restored VM accesses a page that is not yet loaded from the fail-over im-
age, its execution is temporarily paused, and the content of the page is requested. A page
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fetching daemon, called odpf, runs in the restoration host to service such a request. Based
on the GPFN of the requested page, odpf loads the page content from the fail-over image
storage into the memory space of the restored VM. Once the page is brought in, the VM is
un-paused and continues executing.
By requesting memory contents on-demand, no unnecessary pages are transferred for
the restored VM, and the network and storage traffic incurred at the beginning stage of
VM recovery is greatly reduced. The remainder VM pages can be pushed from the fail-
over image storage at a later time to fully populate the memory space of the restored VM
when the system is relatively lighter loaded. Although the execution of the restored VM
is inevitably interrupted by page fetches, we use page pre-fetching to reduce the frequency
of such interruptions, as we will next describe. Interruption to VM execution becomes
minimal once the working set of the VM is brought into memory.
3.4.3 Pre-fetching Nearby VM Pages
Memory references often exhibit spatial locality. When servicing a page fetch request,
it may be beneficial to also fetch pages that are adjacent to the one requested, in anticipation
of the VM’s future needs. However, two factors must be considered for page pre-fetching.
First, pre-fetching can incur additional storage I/O overhead. Second, getting more pages
than the one requested can increase the request service time, keeping the VM paused and
waiting for the requested page longer.
In HydraVM, pre-fetching adjacent pages means reading additional blocks sequentially
in a fetch I/O, or issuing additional sequential I/Os. Since sequential I/Os can be performed
efficiently on storage devices, page pre-fetching will likely incur more benefit than over-
head. In our prototype implementation, odpf accesses the fail-over image over NFS [36],
to take advantage of NFS’ asynchronous read-ahead buffering for page pre-fetching. As
greater memory reference locality is detected (upon detection of greater sequentiality in
fetch I/Os), NFS pre-fetches more pages in the proximity of the requested pages asyn-
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chronously, without blocking the operation of odpf or increasing request service times.
Pre-fetched pages are brought into the page cache memory of the restoration host in paral-
lel with, but not on the critical path of, the page fetch requests issued by the restored VM.
When the VM accesses a pre-fetched page, the content becomes available instantly with
minimal interruption to VM execution.
3.5 Evaluation
We evaluate HydraVM addressing the following questions:
• What type of VM protection does HydraVM provide without making any backup
memory reservation?
• How much overhead is incurred for protection with HydraVM?
• When a host failure is detected, how quickly does HydraVM bring a failed VM back
up?
• How does a fail-over performed by HydraVM affect VM operation?
3.5.1 Testbed and Workloads
We ran all experiments on a testbed consisting of four HP Proliant BL465c blades in
the same LAN. The four blades are used as the primary host, restoration host, VM disk
storage, and fail-over image storage in HydraVM, respectively. Each blade is equipped
with two dual-core AMD Opteron 2.2GHz processors, 4–8GB RAM, two Gigabit Ethernet
cards, and two 146GB SAS 10K rpm hard disks.
The VM under test is configured with 1G memory, one virtual CPU and one virtual
NIC. Its virtual disks are hosted in the VM disk storage under LVM, and mounted in the
primary and restoration hosts via NFS. The VM under test and HydraVM use separate
network interfaces: all VM traffic, including its disk traffic, go through one NIC of the
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hosts, while the VM checkpoint and restoration traffic incurred by HydraVM go through
the other NIC.
We evaluate HydraVM on two types of fail-over image storage, a hard disk drive (HDD)
and a SSD; we replaced one disk in the blade used as the fail-over image storage with an
Intel 80GB X25MMainstream SATA II MLC SSD. HydraVMwrites to and reads from the
VM fail-over image at the granularity of an OS page in its protection and recovery modes,
respectively. Running experiments with both HDD and SSD helps us understand how these
small and largely random I/Os are performed on different storage media types.1
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, HydraVM is suitable for protecting long-running compu-
tation jobs and cluster applications. We used three workloads of these types in our evalua-
tion. HPC-C [8] is a suite of 7 benchmarks essential for long-running scientific jobs. These
benchmarks stress floating point computation and the memory subsystem. All of them are
executed in our experiments. SPECjvm2008 [16] is a benchmark suite for evaluating the
performance of a Java runtime environment. We executed the FFT benchmark of this suite
for 10 minutes in each experimental run.2 FFmpeg [3] is an open-source media transcoding
tool. We used it to convert a 124MB MP4 file to AVI format in our experiments.
Unless otherwise mentioned, all measurements reported are the averages of at least four
runs of each experiment. All bar graphs show 90% confidence intervals. The VM under
test is rebooted between each experimental run.
3.5.2 Storage-based VM Protection
We ran the three workloads in a VM, and configured hacp to take checkpoints of the
VM periodically throughout the execution of the workloads. Table 3.1 summarizes the
average size of each checkpoint taken, the time required to replicate a checkpoint over
the network, the time required to store a checkpoint in the fail-over image and the storage
1In all experiments, the virtual disks of the VM under test were hosted on a hard disk in the VM disk
storage.
2Specifically, we used scimark.fft.large, which computes Fast Fourier Transform and is designed to stress
the memory subsystem by using a dataset large enough to not fit within a standard L2 cache.
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HPC-C
Configured checkpointing interval (sec) 1 2 5
Fail-over image storage HDD SSD HDD SSD HDD SSD
Actual checkpointing interval (sec) 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 5.0
Checkpoint size (MB) 10.2 10.2 12.7 12.6 14.3 14.4
Checkpoint sending time (ms) 93 93 117 116 131 133
Checkpoint storage time (ms) 724 476 808 572 987 665
Checkpoint storage throughput (MB/s) 14.1 21.4 15.7 22.1 14.4 21.6
FFT
Configured checkpointing interval (sec) 1 2 5
Fail-over image storage HDD SSD HDD SSD HDD SSD
Actual checkpointing interval (sec) 1.7 1.6 2.2 2.2 5.0 5.0
Checkpoint size (MB) 38.7 38.7 40.8 40.8 50.8 51.0
Checkpoint sending time (ms) 349 349 368 368 458 459
Checkpoint storage time (ms) 1335 1274 1442 1359 1939 1711
Checkpoint storage throughput (MB/s) 29.0 30.4 28.3 30.0 26.2 29.8
FFmpeg
Configured checkpointing interval (sec) 1 2 5
Fail-over image storage HDD SSD HDD SSD HDD SSD
Actual checkpointing interval (sec) 1.3 1.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 5.0
Checkpoint size (MB) 11.0 10.3 13.1 12.9 20.5 20.8
Checkpoint sending time (ms) 102 95 121 120 189 191
Checkpoint storage time (ms) 1108 607 1123 716 1488 1088
Checkpoint storage throughput (MB/s) 9.9 17.0 11.7 18.1 13.8 19.1
Table 3.1: The size of the incremental checkpoints taken and the time required to send and
store each checkpoint to the fail-over image storage during the execution of the
workloads.
throughput achieved, under different checkpointing frequencies and storage types.
The checkpoint storage throughput achieved is dependent on both the workload in the
checkpointed VM and the storage type. In our experiments, checkpoints are written to a
HDD at a rate of 10–29MB/s. In the three workloads, higher throughputs (26–29MB/s) are
observed for the storage of FFT checkpoints. While FFT touches more memory pages in
each checkpointing interval, resulting in larger checkpoints than the other two workloads,
the I/Os incurred for storing its checkpoints have a higher degree of sequentiality and are
carried out much more efficiently. In our experiments, HDD even achieves a performance
comparable to SSD when storing FFT checkpoints.
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However, in most cases, SSD still handles checkpoint storage more efficiently. Our
results show that for HPC-C and FFmpeg, checkpoints are stored faster on SSD by 7MB/s
than HDD. While SSD generally incurs much lower access latencies without any mechan-
ical parts, its write performance can be affected by the need to erase blocks before reusing
them, and is also workload-dependent. In our experiments, the checkpoint storage through-
puts achieved on SSD range from 17MB/s to 30MB/s. Write performance tends to degrade
with increasing randomness in the I/Os, due to the impact of internal fragmentation and
increased overhead of garbage collecting clean blocks [68].
With these storage throughputs, all three workloads have their checkpoints committed
to storage within each checkpointing interval when checkpointed every 5 seconds, whether
using HDD or SSD in the fail-over image storage. When checkpoints are taken at shorter
intervals, it becomes more challenging to finish writing each checkpoint before the interval
ends. For example, when FFmpeg is configured to be checkpointed every second, each
of its checkpoints takes an average of 0.1 second to be transmitted over the network, and
another 1.1 seconds to be written on a HDD. The total time taken to replicate and commit
a FFmpeg checkpoint to the fail-over image storage thus exceeds the 1-second configured
interval.
hacp does not start the next checkpoint until the on-going one is committed to storage.
As a result, many FFmpeg checkpoints are taken after the configured interval has passed.
The delays result in discrepancies between the configured checkpointing interval (1 second)
and the actual elapsed time between consecutive checkpoints (1.3 seconds on average). If
the fail-over image storage uses a SSD, it takes only 0.6 second on average to store each
checkpoint, and the configured checkpointing frequency of one checkpoint per second can
actually be achieved for FFmpeg. However, SSD does not always meet the I/O demand
of achieving the configured checkpointing frequency. In our experiments, when FFT is
configured to be checkpointed every 1 and 2 seconds, checkpoints are delayed and actually
taken every 1.6 and 2.2 seconds, even when storing on a SSD, since these checkpoints each
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Figure 3.2: The VM pause time incurred for taking an incremental checkpoint. The legend
is given in (configured checkpointing interval, fail-over image storage type).
contain a large number of dirty pages to be stored.
3.5.3 Overheads of VM Protection
HydraVM protection affects the operation of a protected VM, mainly because the VM
must be paused periodically for taking incremental checkpoints. Figure 3.2 shows the
VM pause time incurred for each checkpoint. The pause times are in the order of tens of
milliseconds, and we observed that the time taken to copy dirty pages to a buffer for trans-
mission is the main part. Therefore, pause time increases with the number of dirty pages in
a checkpoint. For each workload, longer pause times are incurred at larger checkpointing
intervals. In the three workloads, FFT incurs the longest pause times, since it has larger
checkpoints than the other two workloads.
Figure 3.3 shows the performance of the workloads running in a protected VM peri-
odically paused and checkpointed throughout the execution of the workloads. Our results
show that HydraVM provides VM protection with a moderate impact on application per-
formance. When checkpointed every 5, 2, and 1 seconds, the execution of HPC-C takes
1–6% longer time to finish comparing to the baseline execution, for which no checkpoints
are taken and no protection is provided. As for FFT, the throughput achieved (operations
completed per minute) drops by 7–22% when protected. FFmpeg takes 12–16% longer
time to finish transcoding the media file under protection.
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Figure 3.3: The performance of the workloads when checkpointed periodically. The run-
time of HPC-C without checkpointing (baseline) is 344 seconds. The baseline
throughput of FFT is 6.1 ops/min. The baseline runtime of FFmpeg is 289.5
seconds.
Although when checkpointed at larger intervals, workload execution is paused for a
longer time in each interval, pauses happen less frequently, and hence the overall impact on
workload performance is smaller. Workload overhead increases as checkpointing interval
becomes shorter. Taking checkpoints at shorter intervals provides a higher level of VM
protection, since if a failure occurs, the VM rolls back to a more recent point in time and
loses a smaller amount of completed work. However, this benefit is gained at the cost of
a larger loss of application performance during normal operation, since VM execution is
interrupted more frequently.
HydraVM provides VM protection with efficient resource usages. hacp and harcv, the
daemons responsible for checkpoint replication, use less than 10% of the CPUs in the pro-
tected host and fail-over image storage, respectively. The daemons each need a transmis-
sion buffer to send and receive checkpoints one-by-one. In our experiments, each daemon
uses no more than 80MB of memory, which is enough for transmitting the largest check-
point of the workloads we use. The memory consumption of HydraVM is significantly less
than that required by approaches maintaining in-memory backup VMs, which, in this case,
would use 1G RAM for the backup VM in addition to the transmission buffers.
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Figure 3.4: The time required to bring up a failed VM from a HDD- and a SSD-based
fail-over image storage.
3.5.4 Restoration of a Failed VM
We now evaluate how quickly HydraVM brings a failed VM back up. We ran the three
workloads in a VM in the protection mode of HydraVM; hacp was configured to take
checkpoints of the VM every second. After executing about 50% of each workload and
finishing the last checkpoint in this time period, we forced the VM to stop, to emulate
the occurrence of a failure. HydraVM then switched to the recovery mode, and hart was
invoked to restore the VM based on its fail-over image and a consistent disk state in the
VM disk storage.
All workloads resumed execution correctly in the restored VM after a brief pause, dur-
ing which HydraVM performs slim restore and brings the VM back up. As shown in
Figure 3.4, HydraVM restores a VM from a fail-over image stored on a HDD in less than
2.2 seconds. If the fail-over image is on a SSD, the VM is restored even faster, using less
than 1.5 seconds. In all experiments, we made sure that no data from the fail-over image is
cached in memory prior to VM restoration. All data loaded during slim restore are loaded
from the storage devices, so that we can include I/O time in our measurements.
HydraVM brings up a failed VM quickly by loading a minimal amount of information
from the potentially gigantic fail-over image in the shared storage. In our experiments, less
than 5MB of data out of the 1G fail-over image is loaded for slim restore, as shown in
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Workload HPC-C FFT FFmpeg
Fail-over image storage HDD SSD HDD SSD HDD SSD
Total data loaded (MB) 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.9 3.3 3.3
Number of page table pages loaded 1083 1083 975 975 823 825
Time to load all page tables (ms) 1342 635 1391 505 996 389
Table 3.2: Amount of data loaded and the loading time incurred during fail-over (slim VM
restore).
Table 3.2. The majority of the data loaded are the VM page tables. The time to load and
restore all page tables constitutes 30–60% of the bring-up times.
We further break down the bring-up time into three stages, in which (1) sufficient mem-
ory is reserved in the restoration host and a container for the VM is constructed, (2) the
page tables, virtual CPU state, and other important data structures of the VM are loaded
from the fail-over image and processed to initialize the VM, and (3) the virtual devices of
the VM are re-connected and the VM is ready to begin execution. Our results show that
on average, stage 1 and stage 3 take 0.4 and 0.2 second to finish, respectively; these times
are independent of the types of device used in the fail-over image storage. The rest of the
bring-up time is spent in stage 2.
This breakdown helps us reason about the fail-over behavior of HA approaches that
use in-memory backup VMs. These approaches perform the tasks in stage 1 when setting
up a backup VM in a dedicated host at the beginning of the protection of a primary VM.
As the primary VM executes, the memory state of the backup, including the data structures
mentioned in stage 2, are repeatedly updated to synchronize with that of the primary. When
the primary VM fails, presumably, only the tasks in stage 3 are left to be completed during
fail-over. Using in-memory backup VMs thus enables very fast fail-over, but at the cost of
making unproductive memory reservation throughout normal VM operations.
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Figure 3.5: The performance of the workloads under different conditions: no protection
and not checkpointed, protected and configured to be checkpointed every sec-
ond, and restored from a failure that occurs halfway through the workload exe-
cutions.
3.5.5 Operation of a Restored VM
In the experiments described in Section 3.5.4, after the VM was restored from the em-
ulated failure, the last 50% of the workloads executed while odpf supplying the memory
contents of the VM on-demand. All three workloads completed execution correctly.
In HydraVM, the impact of a failure includes not only the extra time required to bring
the failed VM back up, but also the slowdown of VM execution after restoration due to
demand paging. To understand this impact, in Figure 3.5, we compare the performance of
the workloads running under three conditions: (C1) no protection and not checkpointed,
(C2) protected and configured to be checkpointed every second, and (C3) restored from a
failure that occurs halfway through the workload executions. C1 and C2 are failure-free
conditions. In C3, the VM is configured to be checkpointed every second (same protection
as in C2) before failure.
For each workload, comparing the performances measured with and without protection
(conditions C1 vs. C2) tells us the cost of protection, while comparing the performances
measured with and without a failure (conditions C2 vs. C3) reveals the total cost of recover-
ing from a failure in HydraVM. Overall, failure recovery does not incur an undue overhead.
In some cases, the workload performance with a failure (and failure recovery) is better than
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Figure 3.6: Number of VM pages fetched to execute the last 50% of the workloads in a
restored VM.
that without a failure (simply under protection), since we did not re-engage protection after
the VM is restored in these experiments. We chose to not re-engage protection, so that
for HPC-C and FFmpeg, we can compare the execution time of the last 50% of the work-
loads running with and without demand paging (conditions C1 vs. C3), to understand the
overhead incurred by the technique.
Recovering from a failure halfway through the execution (condition C3) using a fail-
over image stored on a HDD, HPC-C executes for a total of 360 seconds, 4 seconds longer
than the total runtime measured under protection without a failure (condition C2). Failure
recovery is accomplished at a relatively low cost for HPC-C, mainly because the workload
fetches a small amount of memory data on-demand to finish execution. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.6, during the second half of workload execution, only 44MB of data are fetched from
the fail-over image storage. These fetches concentrate in the first few seconds of the re-
stored execution: 88% of the data are fetched in 6 seconds from a HDD, and more quickly,
in 4 seconds, from a SSD. Comparing the runtime of the second half of the workload under
conditions C1 and C3 (with and without demand fetching) yields a consistent observation
that demand paging incurs a relatively small overhead for HPC-C; fetching from a HDD
and a SSD lengthens the runtime by an additional 7 and 6 seconds, respectively.
The costs of failure recovery are larger for FFmpeg. Without a failure, the workload
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Figure 3.7: The storage I/Os incurred to demand fetch VM pages for FFmpeg after it re-
sumes execution in a restored VM. Each dot represents an I/O, and the size of
the dot represents the size of the I/O.
runs for 335 and 337 seconds under protection, using a HDD and a SSD in the fail-over
image storage, respectively. When a failure occurs in the middle of the execution, the
workload spends 15 more seconds to finish execution, if recovering from a fail-over image
on a HDD. The cost of recovery is smaller when a SSD is used in the fail-over image
storage; workload runtime is lengthened by 6 seconds.
These recovery costs result from the relatively large overheads of demand paging in-
curred by FFmpeg. After resuming in the restoration host, FFmpeg fetches a large amount
of memory data, about 460MB, to finish execution. The workload also has a staged use of
VMmemory, as can be observed from Figure 3.6. It accesses the working set area-by-area,
and fetches new memory pages at a slower pace than the other two workloads. Page fetch-
ing thus affects the execution of FFmpeg for a longer period of time, leading to increased
overheads.
To gain a further understanding of the storage I/Os incurred for demand paging, we
ran blktrace [33] in the fail-over image storage after the failed VM resumes execution.
Using FFmpeg as an example, Figure 3.7 plots the I/O activities that actually occur on the
storage device (a HDD in this case) to fetch page contents for the restored VM. Each dot
represents an I/O request recorded by blktrace, and the size of the dot represents the size
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of the request. We found that even though almost 120,000 4K pages are fetched during
the execution of FFmpeg, only 9,000 I/O requests are sent to the device. The I/O pattern
shows substantial spatial locality, and many of the I/Os fetched 512 disk sectors (256KB of
data, 64 4K pages) at a time, as shown by the large dots in the figure. These observations
suggest that the memory references made by the workload have good locality, and that NFS
read-ahead buffering, exploited by odpf, is effective in pre-fetching near-by VM pages.
3.6 Discussions on Alternative Storage Architectures
We have demonstrated the feasibility of the HydraVM approach via a prototype imple-
mentation and its evaluation in a 4-node testbed. In this section, we discuss how HydraVM
may take advantage of large, parallel storage systems to provide HA support for a large
number of VMs.
Flat Datacenter Storage (FDS) [74] is an example of large, parallel storage system that
may benefit HydraVM. FDS provides a shared, centralized permanent storage based on the
disks or flash in hundreds or thousands of commodity storage servers in a cluster. In FDS,
data are logically stored in blobs and accessed in tracts; FDS uses 8MB tracts to amortize
the cost of disk seeks and achieve comparable performances for sequential and random
accesses. FDS strives to distribute the tracts of a blob uniformly across a vast array of
disks. When an FDS client accesses the storage, hundreds or thousands of disks may read
or write data for the client in parallel, and the client achieves the combined throughput of
all participating disks.
RAMCloud [75] is also a storage system characterized by scale and data parallelism.
Different from FDS, RAMCloud provides DRAM storage by unifying the DRAM of hun-
dreds or thousands of storage servers, and uses disks or flash to store replicas of the data
in DRAM. It exploits scale and data parallelism not to serve client requests (those are sat-
isfied quickly by DRAM accesses), but to speed up the recovery of a failed storage server.
It strives to replicate the DRAM data of a server, in units of 8MB log segments, uniformly
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across thousands of backup disks. When the server fails, the DRAM data can be recovered
by thousands of disks reading their shares of the server’s data replicas in parallel.
Since HydraVM utilizes permanent storage to eliminate backup memory reservation,
below, we primarily use FDS as an example as we discuss how scale and data parallelism
may benefit HydraVM; we will discuss RAMCloud’s techniques where appropriate.
Consider HydraVM using FDS as the shared storage and storing each fail-over image
as a blob. For a VM with 1GB memory, its fail-over image consists of 128 tracts, and
ideally, each tract is stored on a different disk. During protection of the VM, HydraVM
consolidates checkpoints into the fail-over image with a maximum of 128 disks working at
the same time, each updating its share (a tract) of the fail-over image. In theory, even if all
1GB memory of the VM is dirtied and checkpointed, the checkpoint can be stored as fast
as an 8MB tract can be written.
This example illustrates how FDS’s scale and data parallelism may help HydraVM
overcome the intrinsic slowness of permanent storage devices in the protection mode, but
it is simplified in two aspects. First, in reality, deployment of hundreds of disks is expected
to support HA for a large number of VMs for cost-effectiveness; checkpoints of multiple
VMs must contend for disk bandwidth for their storage. Second, HydraVMmust guarantee
atomicity for the storage of each checkpoint across multiple disks and storage servers. We
next discuss the two aspects in more detail.
The developers of FDS executed up to 180 concurrent, networked clients accessing an
FDS cluster of 1,033 disks continuously, and observed a peak aggregate storage through-
put of 67 GB/s, roughly 380 MB/s/client; each client has a 10 Gbps network bandwidth
at its disposal. Consider each of these clients associated with the checkpoint stream of a
VM protected by HydraVM. The measured storage throughput of FDS suggests that un-
der this configuration, (1) each protected VM can have about 300MB of checkpoint data
sent and stored in one second; (2) VMs with a writable working set smaller than 300MB
may be checkpointed at least once every second. Using FDS enables HydraVM to store
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checkpoints quickly and checkpoint VMs frequently, even when many VMs are protected
at the same time. Frequent checkpointing reduces the loss of completed work upon failure.
It also provides the possibility for HydraVM to support network buffering and transpar-
ent recovery of client-facing applications, which are currently unsupported, as discussed in
Section 3.2.3; depending on running applications’ writable working set size, an even larger
FDS cluster or a stage buffer is needed.
To guarantee atomicity of checkpoint storage across multiple FDS disks, HydraVM
may use a few intermediate servers, deployed between the protected hosts and the FDS
cluster. Each protected VM runs its harcv in an intermediate server; one such server can
run the harcv of multiple protected VMs. harcv receives a complete checkpoint from
hacp in a memory buffer, and then writes to the tracts of the checkpoint on the appropriate
FDS disks. It ensures all writes are successful; if any write fails, it retries the operation.
The checkpoint buffer must not become unavailable before the checkpoint is completely
stored. This may be achieved by replicating the intermediate server, or by using a backup
battery in the server; when needed, the battery provides power of the server for checkpoints
to be flushed.
Alternatively, tracts can be stored by a logging approach similar to that in the Log-
structured File System (LFS) [86]; RAMCloud also uses a LFS-like approach to manage
its DRAM and disk storage. This approach writes to a tract by appending the new content
of the tract to storage, rather than overwriting the existing content of the tract. A partially
stored checkpoint does not affect the utility of the fail-over image, so storing each check-
point atomically will not be a concern. However, it is important to keep track of the tracts
constituting the latest consistent fail-over image, which may not always be the latest version
of the tracts. Also, this approach needs to run a garbage collector periodically to reclaim
storage space from tracts that are no longer useful, i.e., those that have newer contents
and are not included in the fail-over image. Garbage-collecting tracts in their entirety can
greatly reduce the collection overhead; if all the data in a tract becomes garbage together,
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no extra I/Os are needed to discover live data and preserve them before reclaiming space
from the tract. Otherwise, the extra I/Os caused by garbage collection can interfere with
and slow down the storage of new checkpoints.
The recovery mode of HydraVM also benefits from the use of a large, parallel shared
storage. When restoring a failed VM, hart can potentially load a large amount of data
from the VM’s fail-over image into the restoration host in a short amount of time. Thus,
during slim restore, additional VM state (e.g., part of the VM’s working set) can be loaded,
to reduce the need of demand fetching and improve the performance of the restored VM.
As the VM executes, odpf may also pre-fetch more memory pages in parallel. The VM’s
memory space can be populated faster, thus reducing the window during which the VM is
susceptible to performance penalties. Note, however, that as the scale and data parallelism
of the shared storage increase, the speed of storage I/Os may become less of a limiting
factor in VM recovery, but the network bandwidth available to individual restoration hosts
may become a new bottleneck.
3.7 Related Work
Upon detection of a host failure, failed VMs may be restarted automatically [21], but
the runtime state of the VMs is lost upon restoration. To minimize such loss, two types
of approaches have been proposed to keep track of and recover from a recent VM state
in a failure. One records the low-level events, e.g., instructions and interrupts, executed
by a protected (primary) VM, and replays them in a backup VM deterministically in lock-
step [20, 32]. If the primary fails, the backup takes over execution from where the primary
left off. Since the primary and backup must execute the exactly same sequence of instruc-
tions, these approaches require the VMs to have identical configurations. Therefore, they
are not exempt from making unproductive memory reservation.
The other type of approaches replicates VM checkpoints continuously throughout nor-
mal VM operations. Most existing systems replicate checkpoints at fixed time intervals, and
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buffer the VM network outputs during each interval until the checkpoint of the interval is
fully replicated to and acknowledged by the backup [24, 39, 44, 47]. Alternatively, Kemari
replicates a checkpoint each time before the VM is about to interact with external devices
(e.g., disk and network) [93]. To reduce the application performance degradations caused
by network buffering, RemusDB [69] buffers VM network outputs selectively. Targeting
database applications running in a VM, RemusDB buffers only those network outputs that
carry transaction control messages, e.g., acknowledgements to COMMIT and ABORT requests.
SecondSite [80] extends the use of checkpoint replication beyond a local area network to
synchronize primary and backup VMs connected by Internet links for disaster recovery.
All the above mentioned systems make memory reservation for backup VMs. Hy-
draVM adapts a periodic, incremental checkpointing technique similar to existing systems,
but unlike these systems, trades off main memory with stable storage to provide a cost-
effective HA alternative for long-running computation jobs and cluster applications. There
are other systems that persist VM checkpoints in stable storage, but for different purposes
than HydraVM. VNsnap [57] captures consistent snapshots of a distributed VM environ-
ment, to suspend and later resume the entire VM cluster. The system was evaluated with
much longer intervals between snapshots (e.g., 10 minutes) compared to HydraVM. Since
VNsnap is not designed for HA, the system does not support fast resumption from VM
snapshots. Burtsev et al. implements transparent checkpoints in the Emulab network
testbed, to provide controls over experiment execution without interfering the realism of
experiments [35]. This system does not support fast resumption from VM checkpoints
either, while HydraVM quickly brings up a VM with slim restore.
The proposed slim VM restore technique is built upon the core idea of fast instantiation
of a VM with partially populated memory space. This idea has been applied to different
types of problems. Post-copy VM migration [50] resumes the execution of a migrated
VM in the destination host immediately after shipping the CPU state from the source VM,
without having the entire memory state copied over. As the VM runs in the destination host,
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memory pages are pulled/pushed from the source VM. Potemkin [95] quickly “forks” new
VMs in single hosts from a reference image and creates private copies of VM pages upon
modification of VM memory; its aim is to implement a large honeyfarm system based on
lightweight VMs. SnowFlock [62] extends the idea of VM fork across machine boundaries.
It creates multiple child VMs based on a condensed parent VM image in a group of hosts.
As the child VMs execute, memory pages are fetched from the parent on-demand. The
focus of SnowFlock is to spread application deployment rapidly, which is most useful in the
area of parallel computations. HydraVM applies a similar technique, however, to address a
completely different problem regarding the resource inefficiency of existing HA solutions.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed HydraVM, a storage-based, memory-efficient way of
achieving high availability in a virtualized environment. Unlike conventional approaches,
which require twice the memory each protected VM uses, HydraVM requires minimal extra
memory, relieving the tension between reliability and resource-efficiency, two critical op-
erational goals of a virtualized environment. HydraVM maintains the VM state needed by
fail-over in a shared storage, and recovers a failed VM promptly in any host that has access
to the shared storage, allowing any host with available capacity to be used as the backup.
HydraVM complements the HA toolbox currently available to administrators of a virtu-
alized environment with a cost-effective alternative suitable for protecting long-running
computation jobs and cluster applications.
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CHAPTER IV
Application-Assisted Live Migration of Virtual Machines
with Java Applications
4.1 Introduction
Live migration [38, 73] is to move a running virtual machine (VM) from a physical host
to another with minimal disruption to the execution of the VM. It has been used for load-
balancing [91, 98], fault-tolerance [71, 89], power savings [30, 40, 72], and performance
enhancements [31].
To migrate VMs within a LAN, such as within a datacenter, the primary task is to mi-
grate the contents of VMs’ memory; VM disk contents can be stored in a shared storage.
Most migration tools transfer VM memory by using a pre-copy approach. While a migrat-
ing VM continues to run on the source host, its memory pages are iteratively transferred to
the destination host. All pages are sent in the first iteration, and at each following iteration,
only those pages dirtied during the previous iteration are sent. Ideally, dirty pages should
be transferred faster than new pages get dirtied, and the number of dirty pages pending
transmission should decrease iteratively. When the VM is paused for the last iteration, a
small number of dirty pages remain to be transferred. After this short stop-and-copy, the
VM resumes execution in the destination, and the migration completes.
However, this ideal migration is not always achievable, since the underlying network
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Figure 4.1: Live migration of a 2GB Xen VM running the Apache Derby database work-
load from SPECjvm2008.
can become a bottleneck. Figure 4.1 shows live migration of a 2GB database Xen VM
over a gigabit Ethernet. Since the database application dirties memory pages much faster
than the pages can be transferred, the number of dirty pages to be transferred does not
decrease iteratively; hence the iterations do not keep becoming shorter. Migration cannot
finish with a short stop-and-copy, but is forced to enter the last iteration after generating
excessive network traffic (a total of 7GB). It incurs a long completion time (66 secs), causes
a noticeable VM downtime (8 secs), and degrades application performance (by over 20%).
To alleviate the network bottlenecking problem during migration and its undesirable
consequences, approaches have been proposed to speed up memory transfer using high-
speed networks [54], slow down memory dirtying by throttling application execution [38],
or reduce the amount of memory contents to be transferred, e.g., by using compression [92].
However, these approaches incur high resource costs or application performance penalties.
The OS’s knowledge can also be utilized to reduce the amount of memory transfer by not
sending clean page cache pages and free pages [60], but the benefit is limited. Page cache
misses may degrade application performance at the destination, and skipping free pages
may only benefit the migration of lightly-loaded VMs.
In this chapter, we propose to reduce the amount of memory transfer by exploiting
application semantics. Specifically, we design application-assisted live migration, which
skips transfer of VM memory pages that need not be migrated for the execution of running
applications at the destination. We build a framework for the proposed approach based on
Xen. Our framework places a paravirtualized stub in the guest VM to enable collaboration
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between the migration tool and applications in the guest. We ask the applications, which
know best their semantics, to identify areas in their memory that need not be migrated.
Based on the applications’ inputs, we maintain a transfer bitmap that guides the migration
tool to transfer or skip over VM memory pages.
Using the proposed framework, we build JAVMM, which migrates Java VMs—VMs
running various types of Java applications—without transferring garbage1 in Java memory.
Targeting Java applications does not restrict JAVMM’s applicability, since these applica-
tions are nearly ubiquitous; with over 9 million developers worldwide, Java has become
the global standard for web-based content and enterprise software, and runs in 89% of
computers in the U.S.[14]. Java applications are increasingly being deployed and run in
VMs for flexible resource sharing and easy deployment. Various types of Java cloud ser-
vices are being widely used [4], many of which are provisioned based on VMs for elasticity.
To migrate Java VMs fast and with little performance impact is therefore an important task.
In JAVMM, Java Virtual Machine (JVM)2 assists in migration on behalf of Java appli-
cations. Right before a migrating Java VM is paused for the last iteration, the running JVM
performs a garbage collection. After the last iteration is completed, the VM resumes exe-
cution at the destination in a post-collection state: in the Young generation of the Java heap,
only one survivor space may contain live objects, which survived the collection. JAVMM
migrates the surviving objects in the last iteration, and skips transfer of the entire Young
generation throughout migration.
We prototyped JAVMM using HotSpot JVM [7] in the proposed framework, and eval-
uated it in terms of three metrics commonly considered for live migration: the time and
resources used by migration, and the impact of migration on running applications’ per-
formance. Our experimental results show that compared to Xen live migration, which is
agnostic of application semantics, JAVMM can reduce the completion time, network traffic
1i.e., Java objects that are no longer used
2Note the difference between a JVM, the application-level VM that executes Java bytecode, and a Java
VM, a general-purpose VM in which Java applications and their JVMs run.
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and application downtime caused by Java VM migration, all by more than 90%, when the
running Java application has a high object allocation rate and needs a large Young genera-
tion space, without incurring noticeable performance degradation to the application.
The primary contributions of this chapter are as follows.
• We propose application-assisted live migration, and establish a generic framework to
skip migration of VM memory selectively based on application semantics.
• Using the proposed framework, we build JAVMM to migrate Java VMs skipping over
garbage with JVM’s assistance, without customizing each Java application.
• Via an in-depth evaluation of JAVMM, we demonstrate the utility of application-
assisted live migration.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews existing
approaches to alleviating network bottleneck during live migration. Section 4.3 presents
our approach, a generic framework for application-assisted live migration. Section 4.4 de-
scribes JAVMM, built based on the proposed framework for efficient migration of Java
VMs. Section 4.5 evaluates JAVMM experimentally. We discuss the applications and pos-
sible extensions of this research in Section 4.6, and conclude the chapter with Section 4.7.
4.2 Related Work
To alleviate network bottlenecking during live migration, approaches have been pro-
posed to send dirty memory pages faster, generate dirty memory pages slower, or send less
data for the dirty memory pages generated.
Huang et al. [54] proposed to transfer memory pages faster using high-speed networks
capable of Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) like InfiniBand. The network remains
a potential bottleneck even with high-speed links, though, considering the increasing com-
putation power of individual VMs and the fact that multiple VMs may be migrated at the
same time.
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Clark et al. [38] proposed to slow down the memory-dirtying rate by moving processes
to a wait queue after they generate more than a certain number of dirty pages. This may
degrade application performance, and as the authors noted, one must be careful not to
throttle interactive services.
Our approach falls in the third category, which transfers less data for the dirty memory
pages generated. Compression [55, 92] and deduplication [41, 42, 99] are popular in this
category, trading CPU for network bandwidth. Our approach skips transfer of selective
memory pages, performing no computations on the pages skipped and incurring a minimal
CPU overhead.
There are also other approaches that skip transfer of selective memory pages, according
to different criteria than ours. Some skip over frequently dirtied pages during live iterations,
but those pages must be transferred in the last iteration [26, 53, 63, 65], risking a long
VM downtime. Page cache pages can be skipped over in all iterations if the storage has
an identical copy of the pages; the contents skipped need to be reproduced [56], or VM
performance may degrade after migration [60]. Post-copy migration skips over all memory
pages and removes the pre-copy stage. To run the VM in the destination, pages are fetched
from the source [50, 51], incurring performance penalties. Free pages can be skipped over
and not fetched upon access [60], by exploiting knowledge of the migrating OS, but only
in lightly-loaded VMs we may find a considerable number of free pages to be skipped.
Our approach exploits knowledge of the migrating applications to skip transfer of se-
lective memory pages. JAVMM skips transfer of garbage in the frequently-dirtied Young
generation of the Java heap. It need not reproduce the contents skipped, and does not de-
grade application performance. Our work is closest to the memory deprotection technique
discussed in RemusDB [69], a VM-based high-availability system for databases. To reduce
system overhead, the authors explored omission of selective memory contents from VM
checkpoints based on application inputs, although data structures to be suitably omitted by
this technique are yet to be identified.
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4.3 Application-Assisted Live Migration
We take a white-box approach to reducing the amount of memory transfer for efficient
VM live migration: we propose to skip transfer of selective VM memory based on applica-
tion semantics, by exploiting applications’ assistance.
4.3.1 What Memory to Skip Migrating?
Generally, memory contents that are reproducible or not required for correct application
execution need not be transferred during migration; these contents also need no replication
in high-availability systems [69].
Examples of reproducible contents include those recoverable from application logs and
intermediate results that can be recomputed. It may be beneficial to skip migrating these
contents if regenerating them in the destination is faster than transferring them from the
source.
Memory contents not required for correct application execution include caches and
garbage. Caches of various kinds, e.g., web cache and database buffer pool, need not
be migrated if the performance drop caused by empty caches at the destination can be
mitigated or is acceptable. Garbage is memory content that is no longer being used. It is
a good candidate to skip, since in its absence, applications execute correctly and without
performance degradation. Garbage exists in any applications written in languages that
do not deallocate memory explicitly; Java, C# and most scripting languages fall in this
category.
4.3.2 Challenges and Design Principles
To skip migration of selective application memory, the key challenge is to let the mi-
gration tool and running applications collaborate. The migration tool needs to know which
memory pages to skip transferring. For the memory contents not transferred, the applica-
tions need to recover or not access them in the destination host.
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Traditionally, the migration tool and an application in the guest VM are unaware of the
execution of each other. They do not, and have no existing channel to, communicate. They
also address memory differently: the migration tool transfers VM memory pages based
on Page Frame Numbers (PFNs), i.e., the page numbers in the VM’s contiguous memory
space, while the application executes based on Virtual Addresses (VAs). For the migration
tool and the application to collaborate, the communication gap and semantic gap between
them must be bridged.
We design a framework to enable their collaboration and be able to skip migration
of selective application memory, following three principles; each principle describes the
responsibility of one software component in our framework.
• The guest kernel provides system-level support for bridging the communication gap
and semantic gap between the migration tool and running applications. It coordinates
between the migration tool and the applications as they perform migration collabora-
tively, so that the migration tool need not interact with each application individually.
• A running application decides which areas of its memory need not be migrated, and
informs the migration tool of it. The application should make this decision, since it
knows best the semantics of its memory, e.g., what each memory area is used for and
when the content is needed.
• The migration tool needs to know which memory pages to skip transfer, without in-
corporating application semantics. This way the tool becomes generic (i.e., application-
independent), and can thus be used for different applications without modification.
This also minimizes changes to existing live migration mechanisms.
4.3.3 A Generic Framework
Figure 4.2 provides an overview of our framework, prototyped based on Xen 4.1; our
guest VM runs Linux 3.1. We added a Xen management command to invoke application-
79
Domain 0 Guest VM
Xen
nlsk
App 1
nlskevtchn
skip-over 
areas
App 2 App 3
LKM
VA-to-PFN
Transfer bitmap
writeread
nlsk
Comm.
proxy
evtchn
Migration 
daemon
/proc
comm. 
msgs
Figure 4.2: A generic framework for application-assisted live migration.
assisted live migration. Once invoked, our migration daemon executes. Our migration
daemon is a modified version of Xen’s. It communicates with applications in the guest
through the guest kernel, and skips transfer of memory pages guided by a transfer bitmap.
We provide guest kernel support in a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM).
4.3.3.1 Bridging the Communication Gap
Our LKM serves as a communication proxy between the migration daemon and the
applications in the guest. It interacts with the migration daemon using event channel, the
event notification primitive provided by Xen. A special event channel port is created when
the guest VM is created, through which the migration daemon can communicate with the
LKM throughout the migration process.
The LKM interacts with the applications using netlink sockets, a special socket family
for communication between kernel- and user-space processes. We use netlink because it is
bi-directional, asynchronous and capable of multicasting. Upon loading, the LKM creates
a netlink socket, and associates it with a multicast group, which the applications subscribe
to. The migration daemon communicates with the applications simply by contacting the
LKM, and the LKM multicasts a netlink message to notify all subscriber applications. The
LKM also relays messages from the applications to the migration daemon.
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4.3.3.2 Bridging the Semantic Gap
The applications identify areas in their memory that the migration daemon can skip
transfer. They specify each skip-over area by a VA range, and pass the VA range to the
LKM via a /proc entry. The LKM finds the PFNs of the skip-over area by page table
walks, while the application continues its normal execution. The LKM may consider a
smaller VA range than that specified by the application. It aligns the start and end VAs of
the specified range to the immediate next and previous page boundaries, respectively, to
ensure pages found in the skip-over area can be skipped by the migration daemon in their
entirety.
4.3.3.3 Skipping Transfer with a Transfer Bitmap
The LKM records the PFNs of the skip-over areas in a transfer bitmap. When transfer-
ring VM memory, the migration daemon examines the transfer bitmap, in addition to the
dirty bitmap maintained by the hypervisor.
The transfer bitmap is created in the guest when the LKM is loaded, and is shared with
the migration daemon when migration begins. It uses one bit per VM memory page (PFN),
based on the same page size used by the dirty bitmap; assuming 4KB pages, the transfer
bitmap uses 32KB per GB of VM memory, incurring a negligible memory overhead. Each
transfer bit is either set (1) or cleared (0). A set transfer bit indicates the page needs to be
migrated; the migration daemon transfers the page if its marked dirty in the dirty bitmap. A
cleared transfer bit indicates migration of the page can be skipped; the migration daemon
does not transfer the page, even if it is marked dirty.
4.3.3.4 Updating the Transfer Bitmap
The transfer bitmap is initialized with all bits set; by default, memory pages are trans-
ferred if they are marked dirty. Figure 4.3 illustrates how the transfer bitmap is updated.
When migration begins, the LKMmakes the first bitmap update. It queries the applications
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Figure 4.3: An example of transfer bitmap updates.
for skip-over areas. For each area in the applications’ response, it remembers the VA range,
finds the associated PFNs, and clears the corresponding transfer bits. Therefore, pages in
the skip-over areas are not transferred even if they are dirtied.
In parallel with, and after, the first bitmap update, the VM continues to run, and each
skip-over area may expand or shrink, i.e., VA ranges and the associated PFNs may join or
leave the area. Subsequent updates to the transfer bitmap may be needed.
A skip-over area is expected to shrink infrequently and by a small amount during mi-
gration, or the benefit of skipping its migration decreases. When the area shrinks, the
application should notify the LKM of the VA ranges leaving the area. The LKM updates
its memory of the area’s VA range accordingly, and immediately, sets the transfer bits of
the PFNs leaving the area. Since the pages may later get dirtied in a memory area requiring
migration, setting their transfer bits immediately ensures transfer of their dirty contents in
the iteration following the dirtying; this guarantees the correctness of migration.
Given the VA ranges leaving a skip-over area, the LKM does not find the PFNs leaving
the area via page table walks, because the VA ranges may have been freed, in which case the
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associated PFNs are reclaimed and no longer found in the page tables. The LKMmaintains
a cache of PFNs with cleared transfer bits. It queries the cache by the VA ranges leaving
the area to quickly find the PFNs that must have their transfer bits set. The cache uses little
memory: 1MB per GB of skip-over area with 4-byte entries (a 0.1% overhead).
When a skip-over area expands, transfer bitmap updates are not required. Not clearing
the transfer bits of the PFNs joining the area does not affect the correctness of migration,
although the pages may be unnecessarily migrated. To reduce the runtime overhead, the
application does not notify when a skip-over area expands. The LKM does not clear the
transfer bits of the PFNs joining the area until in the final bitmap update, which is performed
right before the last iteration begins. Dirty pages in the expanded space of a skip-over area
will be skipped in the last iteration to reduce VM downtime.
In the final bitmap update, the LKM queries the applications again for skip-over areas.
It compares the VA ranges in the response of the applications with those in its memory. For
any expanded space, it finds the PFNs joining the areas via page table walks, and clears
their transfer bits. For any shrunk space, it sets the appropriate transfer bits based on the
cached PFNs. Immediately after the final bitmap update is completed, the VM is paused
and the last iteration begins. In the short window of the final bitmap update, the skip-over
areas should be prevented from shrinking; this ensures the transfer bits of all the pages
leaving the areas are set.
In our current implementation, if a PFN joins or leaves a skip-over area with no changes
in the area’s VA range, the transfer bitmap is not updated. This happens when a virtual page
in the area has its PFN mapping changed in three possible ways: (1) from null to p, when a
page frame is allocated; (2) from pold to p, when the page is remapped due to page sharing,
compaction and migration (within the VM); and (3) from pold to null, when the page is
swapped out. For (1), migration finishes correctly without clearing the transfer bit of the
allocated page, which joins the skip-over area. For (2) and (3), we assume the absence of
these events in skip-over areas during migration, but the LKM can be extended to update
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Figure 4.4: The workflow of application-assisted live migration.
the transfer bitmap for these events with further assistance from the guest kernel.
4.3.3.5 Migration Workflow
Figure 4.4 shows the workflow of application-assisted live migration. Our LKM co-
ordinates between the migration daemon and applications in the guest as they collaborate
through different stages of migration. To ease its job of coordination, the LKM transitions
between states of operation based on the messages exchanged with the migration daemon
and the applications, and takes different actions in each state as described next.
Before migration. Once the guest VM is created, the LKM may be loaded in preparation
for possible migration. Upon loading, the LKM sets up the communication proxy and
the transfer bitmap, and then enters the initialized state, ready for migration. If an
application has memory areas that need not be transferred during migration, it creates a
netlink socket as it runs in the VM, to communicate with the LKM and assist in migration.
Migration begins. The migration daemon connects with the LKM once it is started. The
LKM enters the migration started state, and multicasts a netlink message to query
running applications for skip-over areas. Based on the applications’ responses, it performs
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the first transfer bitmap update. As the VM continues execution, the migration daemon
transfers memory pages based on both the transfer bitmap and the dirty bitmap. The LKM
will be notified by the applications if a skip-over area shrinks, and it updates the transfer
bitmap immediately for the pages leaving the area.
Entering the last iteration. Themigration daemon contacts the LKM again before pausing
the VM and entering the last iteration. The LKM multicasts a netlink message,
asking the applications to prepare for VM suspension. This message also queries the ap-
plications for the current VA ranges of the skip-over areas, which are needed by the final
transfer bitmap update.
To prepare for VM suspension, the applications ensure that when the VM resumes
running in the destination, the contents of their skip-over areas, which are not transferred
to the destination, are recoverable or unneeded. For example, they may need to execute to
a known recoverable state, flush caches or collect garbage. Once completing the actions
required, they notify the LKM, passing along the current VA ranges of the skip-over areas.
Knowing that the applications are suspension-ready, the LKM performs the final
transfer bitmap update, and then notifies the migration daemon to suspend the VM and
proceed with the last iteration. The contents of the skip-over areas should remain recover-
able or unneeded until VM suspension is completed.
Migration finishes and VM resumed. After the last iteration finishes, the migration dae-
mon activates the VM at the destination, and notifies the LKM that VM execution has
resumed. The LKM asks the applications to execute recovery logic for their skip-over
areas, or to consider those areas empty, as they continue to run. It then returns to the
initialized state in preparation for the next migration.
4.4 JAVMM: Java-Aware VMMigration
Using our framework for application-assisted live migration, we have designed and
implemented JAVMM, which migrates Java VMs assisted by JVM.
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In designing JAVMM, we considered skipping transfer of both the JVM code cache
and garbage in the Java heap. The code cache stores native code compiled for performance
enhancements. If it is not migrated, applications can resume running interpreted in the
destination, but we have observed a non-trivial performance drop in such a case. Since the
code cache is small relative to the Java heap, we decided to migrate it as usual, and focus
on skipping the transfer of garbage in the Java heap.
4.4.1 Background on Java Heap Management
As a Java program runs, objects are created in the heap of its JVM. Most implemen-
tations of JVM (e.g., Oracle’s HotSpot and JRockit and IBM’s JVM) use a generational
heap. The remainder of this chapter is presented in the context of HotSpot, based on which
JAVMM is prototyped. The general principles and our design of JAVMM are also applica-
ble to other JVM implementations.
In HotSpot, the heap is divided into Young and Old generations. The Young generation
is further divided into three spaces: Eden and two survivor spaces, From and To. Most
objects are allocated in the Eden. When the Eden gets filled up, JVM performs a minor
garbage collection (GC) to reclaim memory from garbage in the Young generation. Java
(application) threads execute to a Safepoint [6] and pause for a minor GC, so that GC
threads can move objects in the heap in a consistent manner. A minor GC copies live data
in the Eden to the To space. Live data in the From space are either copied to the To space,
or promoted to the Old generation if they have survived a number of minor GCs. At the
end of a minor GC, the Eden is completely empty. The From and To spaces swap roles:
From becomes the one that holds live data, and To becomes empty.
4.4.2 Garbage in Java Heap
To understand Java heap usage, we experiment with the SPECjvm2008 suite [16], a
benchmark suite for measuring the performance of Java runtime environments. We run one
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Workload Description
derby Apache Derby [1] database with business logic
compiler OpenJDK 7 front-end compiler [13]
xml Apply style sheets to XML documents
sunflow An open-source image rendering system [17]
serial Serialize and deserialize primitives and objects
crypto Sign and verify with cryptographic hashes
scimark Compute the LU factorization of matrices
mpeg MP3 decoding
compress Compression by a modified Lempel-Ziv method
Table 4.1: Description of the SPECjvm2008 workloads used in our experiments.
  0
  200
  400
  600
  800
  1,000
  1,200
  1,400
de
rb
y
co
m
pi
le
r
xm
l
su
n
flo
w
se
ria
l
cr
yp
to
sc
im
ar
k
m
pe
g
co
m
pr
es
s
Si
ze
 (M
B)
Old gen
Young gen
(a) Java heap memory usage
  0
  200
  400
  600
  800
  1,000
  1,200
de
rb
y
co
m
pi
le
r
xm
l
su
n
flo
w
se
ria
l
cr
yp
to
sc
im
ar
k
m
pe
g
co
m
pr
es
s
Si
ze
 (M
B)
Live data
Garbage
(b) Garbage in a minor GC
  0
  200
  400
  600
  800
  1,000
  1,200
  1,400
  1,600
de
rb
y
co
m
pi
le
r
xm
l
su
n
flo
w
se
ria
l
cr
yp
to
sc
im
ar
k
m
pe
g
co
m
pr
es
s
D
ur
at
io
n 
(m
s)
(c) Duration of a minor GC
Figure 4.5: Java heap usage and GC behavior of sample workloads from SPECjvm2008
running in a 2GB VM; see Table 4.1 for workload descriptions. The Young
generation of the Java heap is allowed to use at most 1GB memory.
workload from each benchmark category for 10 minutes in a 2GB VM, using HotSpot and
its parallel garbage collector; Table 4.1 describes the workloads used. HotSpot is allowed
to grow the Young generation to the maximum size of 1GB and the Old generation to use
the rest of the VM memory.
Figure 4.5(a) shows the average memory consumption of the Java heap. For 8 of the 9
workloads evaluated, the Young generation grows faster and uses more memory than the
Old generation; up to 98% of the heap memory is consumed by the Young generation. Only
scimark uses more memory in the Old generation, since that workload has more long-lived
than short-lived objects. We observed that for derby, compiler, xml and sunflow, the Young
generation quickly grows to the maximum size of 1GB to accommodate the large number
of objects created by the workloads; these workloads have high object allocation rates.
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A large portion of the Young generation memorymay contain garbage when the lifetime
of the objects is short. For all workloads except scimark, over 97% of the Young generation
memory is garbage collected in a minor GC, as shown in Figure 4.5(b). The amount of
garbage is significant for the four workloads using a 1GB Young generation. We observed
that these workloads fill the Young generation and trigger a minor GC frequently, every
3 seconds or so; each minor GC reclaims almost all of the Young generation memory.
Throughout workload execution, this pattern repeats, and the entire Young generation is
continuously dirtied.
Figure 4.5(c) shows the average time required to collect Young generation garbage by
a minor GC. Our results suggest that it may be faster to collect the garbage than to transfer
them over a bottleneck network link. This applies to all workloads except scimark, which
has exceptionally small amounts of garbage. Even for compiler, which has the longest
GC duration of the workloads, its 950MB of garbage takes 1.5 seconds to be collected,
but would take more than 7 seconds to be transferred over the gigabit Ethernet link in our
testbed. Note, however, that for Old generation garbage, collection may not be faster than
transmission. In our experiments, a full GC can take as long as 4 seconds to collect only
93MB of garbage in the Old generation.
In summary, for a wide range of Java workloads we have made the following observa-
tions.
Observation 1. The Young generation can be large and continuously dirtied, due to the
high object allocation rate of the workload.
Observation 2. A significant portion of the Young generationmemorymay contain garbage,
due to the workload’s use of short-lived objects.
Observation 3. Collecting Young generation garbage may be faster than sending them
over a bottleneck network link.
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4.4.3 JAVMM
The Young generation can generate a large number of dirty pages during the migration
of a Java VM, yet many of the dirty pages may contain garbage (Observations 1 and 2).
JAVMM thus skips transfer of the garbage with assistance of JVM, which knows where
garbage objects are located in memory.
Garbage objects are scattered among live data, and their locations keep changing as
objects become unreferenced. It is impractical to keep track of the locations of garbage
objects in order to skip their migration. Instead, JAVMM enforces a minor GC to collect
garbage for efficient migration, since collection may be faster than network transmission
(Observation 3).
Built on the framework described in Section 4.3.3, JAVMM enforces a minor GC only
once during migration, when running applications are notified by the LKM to prepare for
VM suspension. After the enforced GC completes, the VM is suspended. In the Young
generation, the Eden and To spaces are empty, and only the From space may contain live
data, i.e., the data surviving the enforced GC. These live data are the only Young generation
data that will be used when the VM resumes running in the destination.
JAVMM makes sure to transfer these live data in the last iteration, and throughout
migration, it skips transfer of the memory pages in the Young generation, even if they are
dirtied. JAVMM is thus beneficial for migrating Java VMs with a large and frequently-
dirtied Young generation; this typically happens when the running Java applications are
characterized by high object allocation rates.
4.4.3.1 System Overview
In JAVMM, JVM provides all the assistance needed for VM migration on behalf of
Java applications; no modifications to Java applications are required. Figure 4.6 shows
how JAVMM is built based on our framework for application-assisted live migration; our
prototype uses HotSpot JVM (OpenJDK 7) and its parallel garbage collector.
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Figure 4.6: An overview of JAVMM, which is built on our framework for application-
assisted live migration. This is a zoom-in view of Figure 4.2 with JVM/Java
application being the running application.
We enable JVM to communicate with our LKM and collaborate with the migration
daemon through the LKM. In prototyping JAVMM, we wanted to provide most of the
functionalities required of JVM as pluggable modules, and minimize modifications to the
core HotSpot code. We thus implemented an agent using JVM Tool Interface (TI) [10], a
native programming interface for inspecting and controlling JVM. The TI agent compiles
to a dynamic library to be loaded as Java applications run; it runs in the same OS process as
the JVM/Java applications. JVM interacts with the LKM through the TI agent. When the
functionality required is beyond the current scope of TI, we extend TI with the necessary
modifications to HotSpot.
4.4.3.2 Workflow of JAVMM
Figure 4.7 shows the workflow of JAVMM; it details how JVM accomplishes the actions
required of an application assisting in migration, sketched in the gray boxes of Figure 4.4.
As a Java application runs, our TI agent is loaded. It creates a netlink socket to com-
municate with the LKM.
The agent is notified by the LKM when migration begins, and is queried for skip-over
areas. It obtains the VA range of the Young generation from JVM, and tells the LKM.
Based on the agent’s response, the LKM performs the first transfer bitmap update. It clears
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Figure 4.7: The workflow of JAVMM, with details of JVM’s and our TI agent’s actions
to fulfill the requirements of an application assisting in migration shown in
Figure 4.4.
the transfer bits of the Young generation pages, so the pages will not be transferred even if
they are dirtied.
During migration, the agent notifies the LKM when memory pages leave the Young
generation, so that the transfer bitmap can be updated. In HotSpot, memory pages may be
freed from the Young generation at the end of a GC. We slightly modify HotSpot to notify
when this happens, based on TI’s notification interface of GC events. A callback in our
agent is invoked to pass to the LKM the VA range with memory pages freed, and the LKM
immediately sets the transfer bits of the pages leaving the Young generation.
The agent is notified by the LKM again when migration is about to enter the last itera-
tion, and is asked to prepare for VM suspension. It enforces a minor GC to collect Young
generation garbage; we modify HotSpot to ensure that this GC is not silently ignored.3
As usual, Java threads execute to a Safepoint and pause, and JVM performs a collection.
Once the collection is finished, a callback in our agent is executed; at this time, the Eden and
To spaces are empty, and the Java threads are still paused. Without giving JVM control to
3HotSpot may ignore GC requests when several requests are enqueued at about the same time due to
simultaneous allocation failures in multiple threads—only one of these requests needs to be executed.
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release the Java threads from the Safepoint and resume their execution, the agent notifies the
LKM that the application is ready for VM suspension. The Java threads are thus prevented
from using the heap, and this ensures the Eden and To spaces remain empty until VM
suspension is completed.
Along with the notification of the application being suspension-ready, the agent passes
to the LKM the current VA range of the Young generation and also that of the occupied
From space, which contains the live data surviving the enforced GC. Based on these in-
formation, the LKM performs the final transfer bitmap update. It considers the occupied
From pages “leaving” the Young generation, and sets their transfer bits, in order to ensure
transfer of live Young generation data in the last iteration.
Once the final transfer bitmap update is completed, the migration daemon suspends the
VM, and finishes migrationwith the last iteration. When the VM resumes in the destination,
our agent is notified by the LKM. It returns control to JVM, which in turn releases the Java
threads from the Safepoint. The Java application then resumes execution with all live data
available in the destination.
4.5 Evaluation
We now evaluate JAVMM in comparison with Xen VM live migration, which is a tra-
ditional pre-copy approach that is agnostic of the applications running in the migrating
VM.
4.5.1 Experimental Setup
Our evaluation uses both real-life applications and benchmarks from SPECjvm2008 [16],
the same benchmark suite used to profile Java heap usage in Section 4.4.2.
We run each workload for 10 minutes in a VM configured with 2GB memory and 4
vCPUs. Halfway through the workload execution, we migrate the VM, between two HP
Proliant BL465c blades in the same gigabit Ethernet LAN; each blade is equipped with two
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Figure 4.8: Progress of migrating a VM running the compiler workload from
SPECjvm2008. Each box represents a migration iteration; the width shows
the duration and the area shows the amount of traffic sent. In (b), the second
last iteration of JAVMM generates little network traffic while waiting for the
workload to execute to a Safepoint (0.7 sec) and a minor GC to be done (0.1
sec).
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Figure 4.9: Amount of memory processed when migrating a VM running the compiler
workload from SPECjvm2008. In (b), the 4–10th iterations of JAVMM each
process less than 2MB of dirty memory.
dual-core AMD Opteron 2.2 GHz CPUs and 12GB RAM.
Alongside each workload, we run a custom analyzer that sends out the number of op-
erations completed by the workload once every second. We observe workload throughput
from outside of the VM using a time source that is not affected by temporary suspension of
the VM, which happens before completing migration.
Each experiment is repeated at least three times. Unless otherwise mentioned, we report
the average of the measurements, and show 90% confidence intervals in bar graphs.
4.5.2 Progress of Migration
We begin by analyzing how a Java VM is migrated iteratively by Xen and JAVMM, re-
spectively. We use a VM running the compiler workload from SPECjvm2008 as an exam-
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ple; see Table 4.1 for the workload description. Figure 4.8 plots the progress of migrating
the VM in an experimental run. We plot each iteration by a box, and show the duration and
the amount of traffic sent by the width and area of the box, respectively.
In the first iteration, Xen and JAVMM perform equally well. They both skip sending
about 500MB of memory, as shown in Figure 4.9. Xen skips over pages that are dirtied
before transmission, since such pages may be sent in the next iteration. Prototyped on Xen,
JAVMM also skips over pages that are already dirtied, and in addition, all Young generation
pages. The workload is using a 512MB Young generation when migrated, and most of the
space is skipped over by both Xen and JAVMM in the first iteration.
Xen and JAVMM start to progress differently from the second iteration. Although they
both have more than 500MB of dirty memory pending transmission in the second iteration,
they transfer different amounts. JAVMM sends only 64MB of the dirty memory, skipping
over both repeatedly dirtied pages and Young generation pages. Xen has to send more than
200MB of the dirty memory, since it can only skip over repeatedly dirtied pages.
Since JAVMM sends less dirty data, it finishes the second iteration faster, during which
less memory gets dirtied. As a result, it has even less dirty data to send in the third iteration.
JAVMM reduces the amount of memory transfer effectively as iterations progress. After 10
iterations, little dirty memory remains to be sent. JAVMM then finishes migration with a
short stop-and-copy at the 11th iteration, using 17 seconds and sending 1.6GB of network
traffic.
However, for Xen, the amount of memory transfer does not decrease over the iterations.
Migration is forced to enter stop-and-copy when it reaches the maximum 30 iterations
allowed by Xen’s default; the stop-and-copy takes long, since over 400MB of dirty memory
remains to be sent. Xen finishes migration taking 58 seconds and sending 6.1GB of network
traffic, i.e., over 3x longer time and more traffic than JAVMM.
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4.5.3 Performance of Migration
Next, we evaluate JAVMM for workloads with different characteristics of Java heap
usage.
Workload characterization. When profiling sample workloads from SPECjvm2008 in
Section 4.4.2, we found the workloads fall in the following three categories according to
Java heap usage; see Table 4.1 for description of the workloads.
• Category 1. The Young generation quickly grows to the maximum size, since the
workload has a high object allocation rate. The derby, compiler, xml and sunflow
workloads are in this category.
• Category 2. The Young generation grows faster than the Old generation, albeit not
maximally utilized. The workload has a medium object allocation rate. The serial,
crypto, mpeg and compress workloads are in this category.
• Category 3. The workload has a small Young generation and a large Old generation,
since the object allocation rate is low, and most of the workload data are long-lived.
Scimark is the only workload in this category.
Our observations on object allocation rates are consistent with the measurements by
other researchers [90].
We evaluate JAVMM using one workload from each category. For Category 1, which
is the most favorable workload scenario for JAVMM, we evaluate derby; in the workloads
of this category, derby uses the largest Old generation, which JAVMM has to transfer. For
category 2, we evaluate crypto. For category 3, which is the least favorable workload
scenario for JAVMM, we evaluate scimark.
Derby, crypto and scimark are all CPU-intensive workloads. They use up 90% of CPU,
and perform no network I/Os. Table 4.2 shows their experimental settings. While each
workload can use a maximum 1GB Young generation, when migrated, the Young genera-
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Workload
Max allowed Observed when migrated
Young gen (MB) Young gen (MB) Old gen (MB)
derby 1024 1024 259
crypto 1024 456 18
scimark 1024 128 486
Table 4.2: Workloads with different characteristics of Java heap usage and their experimen-
tal settings.
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Figure 4.10: Performance of JAVMM and Xen live migration for workloads with different
characteristics of Java heap usage.
tions of derby, crypto and scimark are using 1GB, 0.4GB and 0.1GB of memory, respec-
tively.
How fast does JAVMM migrate a Java VM? Figure 4.10(a) shows the time required to
migrate the VMs running the three workloads. JAVMM migrates the derby VM fastest,
taking only 12 seconds. Compared to Xen, which takes over a minute to migrate the VM,
JAVMM reduces the migration time by 82%. JAVMM also achieves a 69% reduction of mi-
gration time for the crypto VM. For scimark, JAVMM can skip over little Young generation
memory. It migrates the VM using a comparable amount of time as Xen.
How much resource does JAVMM use for migration? Figure 4.10(b) shows the amount
of network traffic transferred to migrate the VMs. For derby and crypto, JAVMMmigrates
the VM sending even less traffic than the VM size, while Xen sends up to 3.5x the VM size
of migration traffic. Compared to Xen, JAVMM reduces migration traffic for derby and
crypto by 84% and 72%, respectively. For scimark, JAVMM achieves a 10% reduction of
migration traffic.
Thanks to the reduced data transfer, JAVMM also uses up to 84% less CPU time than
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Figure 4.11: Effect of VM migration on the throughput of running application, i.e., the
number of operations completed per second. Migration begins after the appli-
cation runs for 300 seconds.
Xen in migrating the VMs. In these experiments, JAVMM uses at most 1MB of memory
for the transfer bitmap and PFN cache.
Howmuch does JAVMMaffect application performance? Figure 4.11 shows the through-
puts of the workloads. For each workload, the VM is migrated after the workload runs for
300 seconds. Using JAVMM, the workload experiences no noticeable throughput degrada-
tion during migration, except the short pause before migration finishes. When migrated by
Xen, the workload can experience an extended downtime.
Figure 4.10(c) shows the workload downtime. The downtime includes the time spent
in the last iteration and the resumption time. The resumption time is required to reconnect
VM devices and activate VM execution in the destination; this time is short, only about
170 ms in our measurements. For JAVMM, the downtime also includes the time required
to finish the enforced GC while the workloads are paused at a Safepoint, as well as the time
required by the final transfer bitmap update; the latter is completed quickly, within 300 µs
in all our experiments.
Derby experiences 1.2 seconds of downtime when the VM is migrated by JAVMM,
83% shorter than the 9-second downtime when the VM is migrated by Xen. Derby dirties
the 1GB Young generation rapidly, but JAVMM can still reduce the amount of memory
transfer iteratively, by skipping transfer of Young generation pages. In the last iteration,
JAVMM sends only 11MB of dirty data, skipping over Young generation garbage, while
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Workload
Max allowed Observed when migrated
Young gen (MB) Young gen (MB) Old gen (MB)
xml 1536 1536 28
derby 1024 1024 259
compiler 512 512 86
Table 4.3: Workloads with high object allocation rates and their experimental settings.
Xen has over 900MB of dirty data to be sent. JAVMM thus reduces the downtime of derby
significantly compared to Xen, even though it uses 0.9 second to finish the enforced GC; the
GC duration can be further shortened with Java heap fine-tuning or increased parallelism.
For crypto, JAVMM also achieves a 73% shorter downtime than Xen.
However, for scimark, JAVMM imposes a 10% longer downtime than Xen; scimark is
paused for 1.2 and 1.3 seconds when the VM is migrated by Xen and JAVMM, respectively.
For this workload, JAVMM takes time to perform the enforced GC, but the amount of data
to be transferred in the last iteration is not reduced. Most of scimark’s objects are long-
lived. They survive the GC enforced, and must be sent in the last iteration.
Summary. JAVMM is advantageous in migrating the VMs running derby and crypto,
representatives of workloads with non-trivial Young generation sizes and object allocation
rates. Compared to Xen, JAVMM migrates these VMs achieving shorter completion time,
smaller network traffic and shorter downtime. Scimark represents workloads using a small
Young generation and many long-lived objects. Compared to Xen, JAVMM migrates this
VM with a slightly longer downtime, although it achieves comparable, or slightly better
migration time and traffic.
4.5.4 Impact of Young Generation Size
We conducted a second set of experiments for the workloads most favorable for JAVMM,
Category 1 workloads with high object allocation rates. We evaluate the benefit of using
JAVMM for these workloads with varying sizes of Young generation, focusing on the same
three evaluation questions discussed in Section 4.5.3.
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Figure 4.12: Performance of JAVMM and Xen live migration for Category 1 workloads
with different size Young generations.
We experimented with derby and two additional workloads, xml and compiler, from
Category 1. All three workloads are CPU-intensive and without network I/Os. We specify
different maximum sizes for the Young generations of the workloads, as shown in Table 4.3.
When migration begins, the Young generations of xml, derby and compiler all reach the
maximum sizes. They are using 1.5GB, 1GB and 0.5GB of memory, namely, 75%, 50%
and 25% of the VM memory, respectively.
Figure 4.12(a) shows the time required to migrate the VMs running the three workloads.
With high object allocation rates, the workloads dirty the entire Young generation space
rapidly. For Xen, the larger the Young generation, the more dirty memory are repeatedly
transferred, and the longer it takes to migrate the VM. On the contrary, JAVMM migrates
the VMs with larger Young generations faster, since more dirty memory are skipped over.
JAVMM thus achieves greater reductions of migration time for the VMs with larger Young
generations, than Xen. For the xml, derby and compiler workloads, JAVMM migrates the
VM using 91%, 82% and 69% less time than Xen, respectively.
A similar trend is observed for the amount of network traffic sent for migrating the
VMs, as shown in Figure 4.12(b). For JAVMM, the larger the Young generation, the less
migration traffic is sent, and it achieves a greater traffic reduction than Xen. JAVMM sends
93% less traffic than Xen to migrate the VM running xml, which has the largest Young
generation of the workloads.
Figure 4.12(c) shows the downtime incurred by the workloads before migration is com-
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pleted. When the VM is migrated by Xen, the workloads with larger Young generations
incur longer downtimes. A large portion of the Young generation keeps getting dirtied until
the VM is paused for the last iteration, due to the workloads’ high object allocation rates.
Xen has up to 1.5GB of data to send in the last iteration, resulting in up to 13 seconds of
downtime.
For JAVMM, there is not a direct relationship between downtime and the Young gener-
ation size, since downtime also affected by other factors, i.e., the duration of the enforced
GC and the amount of surviving data to be sent in the last iteration. The three workloads
experience about 1.2 seconds of downtime when the VM is migrated by JAVMM, up to
91% shorter than their respective downtimes incurred when migrated by Xen.
4.6 Discussions on Applications and Extensions
When to use JAVMM? JAVMM is most beneficial for the cases which are most problem-
atic to traditional pre-copy approaches—when the VM to be migrated runs Java applica-
tions with large Young generations and high object allocation rates.
In some cases, JAVMM should be used with consideration of the resulting application
downtime. The first is when the application requires long minor GCs, since the duration
of the enforced GC increases downtime. The second is when the application has a high
object survival rate. Many objects may survive the enforced GC and must be transferred
during stop-and-copy. Scimark is such an example. The third is when the application is
read-intensive for which traditional pre-copy approaches can reduce downtime effectively;
the GC enforced by JAVMM is likely to increase downtime.
Use JAVMM for large VMs with fast networks. Our evaluation has shown benefits
of JAVMM by migrating a 2GB VM over a gigabit Ethernet. These benefits remain as
VMs configured with tens or hundreds of GBs of memory are migrated over 10 Gbps or
faster networks, since in such scenarios, the VM processing power, application memory
footprints and memory-dirtying rates likely increase proportionally. As we continue to
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deploy JAVMM in upgraded environments, the underlying network may remain as much a
bottleneck as in our current testbed.
Use JAVMMwith other garbage collectors. While the design of JAVMM is orthogonal to
the choice of garbage collector, we are particularly interested in porting JAVMM to run with
collectors that use a non-contiguous VA range for the Young generation for performance
evaluation and optimization. HotSpot’s garbage-first garbage collector [43] is one such
example.
Support large and multiple applications. The LKM updates the transfer bitmap on ap-
plications’ behalf. It can coordinate concurrent bitmap updates from multiple applications,
and prevent the applications frommanipulating others’ memory. While the LKM can notify
a set of applications with multicast, care is needed to collect responses from all of them and
handle any straggler. We are also investigating parallelization of transfer bitmap updates to
handle large skip-over areas efficiently.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed application-assisted live migration, skipping transfer
of selective VM memory pages based on application semantics. We have built a generic
framework for the proposed approach, which is then used to build JAVMM, a system that
migrates VMs running Java applications skipping transfer of garbage in Java memory. Our
experimental results have shown that JAVMM can migrate a Java VM with up to more
than 90% less completion time, less network traffic and shorter application downtime than
Xen live VM migration, which is agnostic of application semantics. JAVMM also incurs
a lower CPU cost than Xen live VM migration and a negligible memory overhead. In
JAVMM, JVM is enabled to provide all the assistance needed for migration on behalf of
Java applications; no modifications to Java applications are required by JAVMM for effi-
cient migration of a VM.
101
CHAPTER V
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have explored ways to replicate VMs for HA using resources effi-
ciently, and to migrate VMs fast, with minimal execution disruption and using resources
efficiently. We now summarize the contributions of this thesis and the directions in which
the research of this thesis can be extended.
5.1 Thesis Contributions
To reduce the network traffic of checkpoint replication in a HA system, we have shown
that checkpoint compression can be applied, adapting to the workload types and resource
constraints in the system, by evaluating and comparing the strengths and weaknesses of
different compression methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed
evaluation and characterization of checkpoint compression methods in the context of sup-
porting HA, considering gzip, delta and similarity compressions. Based on the evaluation
results, we provide guidelines for their selection and usage.
To reduce the memory requirement of maintaining backup VMs for HA, we have shown
that a memory-efficient HA alternative is feasible, by building HydraVM, a storage-based
HA approach for VMs. HydraVM uses a new combination of well-known system tech-
niques, including incremental VM checkpointing, demand paging and pre-fetching, to
solve the real-world problem of providing resource-efficient HA support for VMs. Our
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prototype implementation and evaluation of HydraVM demonstrate the applicability of
this solution.
Finally, we have shown the utility of running applications’ assistance in VM live mi-
gration. We have established a generic framework for application-assisted live migration,
which selectively skips transfer of VM memory based on application semantics. Using this
framework, we have built JAVMM, which migrates Java VMs skipping transfer of garbage
in Java memory by leveraging JVM’s assistance. Our evaluation of JAVMM in comparison
with Xen live migration, which is agnostic of applications running in migrating VMs, has
validated the effectiveness of our approach.
5.2 Future Directions
The research in this thesis can be extended in the following directions:
• Hybrid and automatically selected checkpoint compression methods in HA sys-
tems.
Our characterization of compression methods shows that it is useful to combine the
strengths of different compression methods in a hybrid approach. Cully et al. [39]
briefly discussed using gzip and delta compression together to achieve greater reduc-
tions of checkpoint traffic, but our evaluation suggests that combining them could
potentially incur high CPU and memory costs at the same time. We propose to com-
bine a lightweight technique, like similarity compression, with heavyweight ones,
such as gzip. Coarse-grained similarity compression (e.g., based on 1K chunks) can
be used to achieve a meaningful, though not significant, reduction of checkpoint
sizes, at a low computing overhead. The remaining checkpoint data can be com-
pressed greater and faster with gzip. If for some workloads, similarity compression
reduces checkpoint traffic effectively already, gzip need not be performed.
We would also like to develop heuristics that utilize the insights from our evaluation
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to automate the selection of compression methods according to workload types and
resource constraints, and even to dynamically adjust the selection decisions at run-
time. Such heuristics are especially useful for building an intelligent HA system to
provide VM protection at a large scale using resources efficiently.
• Transparent failure recovery of client-facing applications by a storage-based
HA approach.
It is challenging for a storage-based HA approach like HydraVM to checkpoint a
protected VM frequently like approaches using in-memory backups do and support
network buffering, which in turn enables transparent failure recovery for client-facing
applications running in the VM, since each checkpoint takes much longer to store on
permanent storage devices than in memory. Large, parallel storage systems help
overcome the intrinsic slowness of permanent storage devices, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.6, but it can be difficult to rely solely on the storage system’s scale and data
parallelism to achieve the kind of checkpointing frequencies required by network
buffering to not incur undue delays on network packets, especially when running ap-
plications have large writable working sets. It would be useful to use a small amount
of memory in a stage buffer, to hold and coalesce part of the VM state (e.g., the most
frequently checkpointed pages) before writing them to storage. This limited use of
memory speeds up checkpoint storage during VM protection, and can also help in
fast VM recovery.
• Exploiting greater intelligence of running applications in VM live migration.
In application-assisted live migration, we have presented a framework for the migra-
tion tool to be informed by running applications and know, for each memory page of
the migrating VM, whether to send or skip the page. We plan to extend this frame-
work so that the migration tool can receive more guidance from running applications
and exploit the greater intelligence therein. The tool can then perform a richer set
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of operations to reduce the amount of memory transfer for efficient live migration.
For example, the tool can apply compression on the memory pages that are not being
skipped over. This not only reduces memory transfer further, but also uses com-
pression, a CPU-expensive operation, at a lower cost. The transfer bitmap in our
framework can be augmented to have more than one bit for each VM memory page,
and indicate the suitable compression methods to apply before sending the page over
the network.
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